Appendix. A Sociological Study of Ukraine's Foreign Policy and Geopolitical Orientations and its National Security Policy

Introduction

In June, 1998, pursuant to the "Monitoring Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy" Program, which has been in effect since January 1997, the Ukrainian Center for Peace, Conversion and Conflict Resolution Studies (UCPCCRS) carried out a regular quarterly expert poll. The Project is supported by the Freidrich Ebert Foundation (Germany). Polls were conducted in March, June, September, December, 1997, and in March, 1998. All six polls involved an analogous set of instruments, with a certain program, additionally depending on the latest course of events.

The polls involved 39-44 experts representing the following four groups:

1. Officials from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and associates of research structures engaged in rendering advice to state power bodies (the National Institute for Strategic Studies, the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine, etc.).

2. Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, primarily members of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Relations with the CIS and the Committee for Defense and State Security. They represent the entire political spectrum - right, center, left.

3. Servicemen with the Armed Forces of Ukraine holding the rank of not lower than Lieutenant Colonel, officials from the Ministry of Defense, professors and specialists of higher educational institutions and research centers, most of them having scholarly degrees (the military-professional intellectual elite).

4. Leading journalists specializing in international themes and representing the most influential mass media. There are grounds to consider that they have an influence not only on public consciousness regarding the issues of our research, but also on the standpoint of the political elite (establishment). The results of the expert pollstestify to the fact that in Ukraine two basic points of view regarding further ways of development that would correspond to Ukraine's national interest exist.

These are: the orientation of "Ukraine's accession to NATO independently from other countries" and the orientation of "Ukraine's neutral and/or non-aligned status". At first the former orientation predominated (47.6% of experts in March, 1997, versus the adherents of neutrality at 28.6%), while in the course of 1997 the latter variant gradually gained importance. By the spring of 1998 both orientations had equalized each other, each having 43.6% of adherents. There is also an insignificant group of experts assuming an unrealistic "accession to NATO together with CIS countries" orientation. In March, 1998 this orientation was supported by 2.6% of the experts. Its general strength during the period of the research did not exceed 7%. There are few adherents of such variants as "Ukraine's accession to a military alignment of CIS countries as an alternative to accession to NATO" - 5.1% in March, 1998 (7-9% overall, zero in December, 1997) or of any other variants, totaling 5.1% (7-9% or zero overall).

On the one hand, these results could be explained by a certain disappointment in the condition of Ukraine's integration potential (that can be confirmed by other indices), on the other hand - by the activation of the Russian direction of foreign policy under conditions when the RF is gradually losing attractive features (taking into account, for instance, its concept of relations with its most closely "integrated" partner - Belarus').

In this regard, the electoral preferences of the experts are interesting. They actually remained unchanged from December, 1997 until March, 1998, with the following exception: on the eve of the parliamentary elections the number of experts intending to vote for a candidate deputy if he would adhere to Ukraine's earliest accession to NATO increased more than twofold (12.5% in December, 1997, 28.2% in March, 1998). At the same time, an advantage was gained by the adherents of a balanced development of Ukraine's relations with both Russia and the West (65% and 61.5% respectively) and of a comprehensive economic integration with the West (47.5% and 33.3%). The adherents of the priority of developing relations with Poland could count on the support of one tenth of the specialists. (The total percentage exceeds 100% since the experts could give two variants in answer). The adherents of a union with Russia, up to unification into a coherent state, almost failed to find support among the experts.

According to the results of the expert poll of June 1998, the main foreign-policy orientations of Ukraine remain as follows: first, orientation toward "Ukraine's accession to NATO", and second, orientation toward "Ukraine's neutral and/or non-aligned status". For one and a half years - a rather long period of time for Ukraine, both alternatives have been supported by firm adherents and are rather stable. In March 1998, against the background of, in the experts' estimations, the general worsening of the relationship between Ukraine and NATO, the orientation toward Ukraine's accession to NATO lost a certain percentage of adherents (from 51.2% at the end of 1997 to 43.6% in March, 1998), but this situation did not last long. In June, 1998 the group of experts supporting the pro-NATO orientation regained adherents - to 50%, which, with insignificant fluctuations, became a stable result in 1997. If we assume that the adherents of the least realistic "accession to NATO together with CIS countries" orientation, who constituted 5% in June (2-7% overall), join the above-mentioned group, we can assume that the pro-NATO orientation, among others, remains the overwhelming one. The other basic orientation - toward Ukraine's neutral and/or non-aligned status - was as firm as the former one in March, 1998 (43.6%), but never dominated prior to that time. It gradually gained adherents during the past year (from 28 to 41.5%) and in the summer of 1998 was supported by 40% of the experts.

Such variants in the development of the situation as "Ukraine's accession to a military alliance of CIS countries as an alternative to accession to NATO" or any other variants are gradually losing support. In June, 1998 they gained fewer adherents (2.5% each) than in March, 1998 (5.1% each) or during the last year (not more than 7-9%).

In the course of the poll conducted in June, 1998, it was suggested for the first time to the experts to estimate the main goals of Ukraine's foreign policy. This was intended to provide more detailed information compared to the above-mentioned orientations within the framework of the "NATO - neutral and/or non-aligned" dichotomy.

According to the experts, the most important goals of current Ukrainian foreign policy are as follows:

· First, the creation of conditions under which Ukraine would not have to worry about its security and would be able to focus on its internal problems (74.3% of the experts).

· Second, the establishment of a general security system which precludes war as a means of solving international conflicts (58.3%).

· Third, the establishment and development of partnership relations with Russia (53.8%).

· Fourth, the intensification of partnership relations with Central-Eastern European and Baltic countries (50%).

· Fifth, Ukraine's assumption of the function of a North-South, East-West transportation (transit) corridor— (47.1%).

After that, the experts mentioned as important but less significant such goals as the intensification of partnership relations with CIS countries, and managing to obtain wide-scale assistance and investments from the West.

Most experts mentioned the following goals of Ukraine's foreign policy as secondary ones:

· First, the development of cooperation with "new nuclear states" (India, Pakistan).

· Second, the reformation of the United Nations organization.

· Third, the strengthening of the missile technologies non-proliferation regime.

The experts had various (indefinite) opinions as regarding such goals as Ukraine becoming (and being strengthened AS) a regional leader of Central Eastern Europe, the initiative of further disarmament, and the complete and ultimate banning of nuclear tests.

The General Characteristics of Ukraine's Foreign Policy

According to the experts' estimations, the situation of Ukraine's international security could be deemed comparatively safe in December 1997 (at least, compared with the other periods of research in 1997). The smallest concern of the experts about the presence of an external threat to Ukraine during the entire year was registered at its end, while the greatest threat was marked in March and September 1997, somewhat less, in June 1997. In December only 19.5% of the experts stressed the presence of a threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity (1.5 times fewer than in March and September, in June - 22.5%). The possibility of the appearance of a threat at any moment was emphasized by 31.7% of the experts (50% in March, 42.5% in June, 43.9% in September). In turn, the absence of such a threat and the existence of all the preconditions for preventing its emergence was stressed by 34.1% of the experts (twice more than in March - 14.3%, and three times more than in September - 9.8%; in June - 27.5%). The assumption that the emergence of a threat should be expected in 1-2 years or in 3-5 years was shared by an insignificant group of the experts - ranging from 2.4% in March to 7.3% in September.

These evaluations coincide with the results of the poll attesting to the realization by the foreign-policy environment of Ukraine of positive changes regarding the status of international security in Europe as a whole compared with the beginning of 1997, though the positive character of the experts' evaluations suffered a certain decline in September. According to their estimations, since March the status of international security in Europe has not worsened, but has remained unchanged and, to a certain extent has become better. As for the determination of the status of international security in Europe during the year, according to most Ukrainian foreign-policy experts, it is slightly lower than in Europe as a whole. Since June, when, in the experts' opinions, the situation grew better compared to March, no essential changes in this respect have taken place. At the same time, the level of international safeguards to Ukraine from other countries gradually increased during the year. In December, 1997 the experts estimated it as close to "medium", while in March they consciously estimated it at as "low". Furthermore, since June, when estimations of a certain worsening of the state's international situation according to this index were registered, in the foreign-policy environment one could observe a growth in importance of the presence of the Armed Forces in providing national security and an increase in its share of doing so - the extent to which Ukraine should rely on its own Armed Forces in providing national security. However, according to the experts' estimations, the readiness of the Armed Forces is constantly worsening. The poll shows that during 1997 the role of economic determinants (stressed by 63-73% of the experts) and political determinants (stressed by 24-46% of the experts) in providing national security for Ukraine was on the rise.

These factors were connected with the pre-election campaign to the Verkhovna Rada (elections were held in March, 1998) and the realization by Ukraine's partners of the weaknesses of democratic institutions in the state.

The estimation of the situation concerning Ukraine's constraint to follow the lead of other states and alignments, to be subject to their dictates and expectations, even in the case of conflict with its national interest, was rather ambiguous. According to the experts' estimations, in June and September, 1997 such "constraint" was growing, ranging between "high" and "medium" (closer to "medium"), but lessened in December, ranging between "medium" and "low" (closer to "medium"). At the same time, the experts' estimations of the extent to which Ukraine "has to rely on its allies in the realization of its foreign-policy goals", which had almost not changed as of December, 1997, grew somewhat and came closer to "medium" than previously.

It is evident that the final estimations by the foreign-policy circles of the lessening of the extent of Ukraine's dependence on the standpoint of other states and alignments were influenced by certain objective circumstances connected with the signing of bilateral political treaties with Russia and Romania, the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine, and important documents with Central European countries. From the formal, objective point of view, in the second half of 1997 Ukraine's foreign policy acquired a measure of self-sufficiency (with respect to independence from external determinants) that it had never had since the Proclamation of Independence in 1991. This situation was caused by the almost simultaneous settling of the most acute and contradictory matters in relations with Russia and Romania (that instantly led to the minimization of actual or evident determinants of external threats) on the one hand, and on the other hand, by the establishment of a certain level of institutional linkages with NATO - as the most important defensive and military-political organization of the West.

Taking into account the stable Ukrainian tradition of foreign-policy balance in the international arena, one could forecast the strengthening of the elements of a demonstrative "equal distancing" alongside with the ever growing regionalization of practical interests and tasks of diplomacy. This balance will acquire features of a certain functional distribution of interests and spheres of cooperation: economic aspects dominating in relations with Russia and other post-Soviet countries and military-political plots in relations with western states.

However there are a number of objective determinants which could cause an essential strengthening of Ukraine's external dependence on foreign partners. These include first of all economic and financial circumstances and certain subjective determinants. In relations with Russia this dependence may result in the "conversion" of debts in the form of a transfer of shares of some economically attractive enterprises. In relations with the West (the USA and EU countries), the budgetary deficit and non-stability of the Ukrainian financial system will cause an aggravation of dependence on external loans and investments. This process is multi-faceted. The unwillingness of Western investors to invest in the Ukrainian economy can result in the gradual lowering of prices for Ukrainian investment entities. Conditionally speaking, the lowering of prices to a certain level, alongside with the growth of the government's financial dependence on international financial institutions can reach the point where the profitability of investment conditions will exceed the influence of economic risk factors.

At the same time, in December 1997 the experts' estimations of the extent to which Ukraine should rely on its allies in the realization of its foreign-policy tasks increased somewhat. By the end of the year these estimations, which earlier had not changed, came closer to being "medium".

With respect to integration processes, certain correlated changes, especially in the Eastern and the Western directions, took place during the year. As the process of integration with Russia and the CIS became more and more intensive, the rates of integration with NATO, the EU, etc. decreased. According to the experts' estimations, in December, 1997 the situation changed essentially - the process of eastward integration essentially lost its pace, while westward integration became more intensive, coming closer to its initial level (of March, 1997) - now approaching the "medium" level. In general, the process of integration with NATO, the EU, etc. is more intensive than the process of integration with Russia and the CIS, the status of the latter approaching a "slow" level.

Furthermore, the experts' estimations testify to the fact that since March, 1997 a certain intensification of Ukraine's integration into the Black Sea region and into Central and Eastern Europe was taking place. According to the estimations, integration in these directions is not as intensive as westward integration, but is also not as slow as eastward integration. On the average, the status of this process ranges between "medium" and "slow".

One could ear-mark three groups among the Ukrainian political elite that are adherents of integration in this or that direction. Thus, during 1997 "pro-Russian politicians" (mentioned by 70-88% of the experts, 67% in June) and "left-wing deputies of the Verkhovna Rada" (51-61%, 70% in June) led among those striving for integration with Russia, up to unification into a coherent state. Other, less important groups consist of "entrepreneurs from Ukrainian-Russian groups" (31-37%, 54% in September), and "socially deprived strata of the population" (34-39%, 22% in June). The share of the former increased significantly in September and decreased in December. According to the experts, the groups of "leaders of MIC enterprises oriented toward cooperation with Russia" (24-36%), "regional leaders of the East and the South" (31-35%, 19% in December), "officers of the Armed Forces" (2-10%) also belong to the adherents of this direction. Other groups are not significant (2-7%).

Among the main adherents of another direction of integration - with the West, all the way up to joining NATO, the experts first of all mention the "right-wing deputies of the Verkhovna Rada". Since March, 1997 this group had been mentioned by 82-87% of the experts, in December - by 68.3%, which by no means influenced its first-place position. In the experts' opinions, the second concerned group consists of the "leaders of finance and the banking business". In March they were mentioned by 66.7% of experts, but in June - by half that number - 33.3%. Despite this fact, this group kept the second-place position during the year, and was mentioned by 47.5% of the experts in September, 56.1% in December. Other, less important groups, according to the experts, consist of the "centrist deputies in the VR" (mentioned by 30 to 40.5% of the experts, permanently occupying the third-place position) and "medium-size businessmen" (from 26% to 35% of the experts, maintaining the fourth-place position). The "leadership of the Ministry of Defense, General Staff" is also mentioned among the adherents of integration with the West, all the way up to joining NATO (in March - 16.7%, since June - 28-24%). An ambiguous opinion is expressed by the experts as to "producers of arms and specialized techniques": in March and September this group was almost insignificant (4.8% and 2.5% respectively), while in June and December its weight increased somewhat (10.3 and 14.6% respectively). In the same way, the group of "leaders of MIC enterprises" was mentioned by 4-5% of the experts from March until September, but in December - by 17.1%. According to the experts' estimations "officers of the Armed Forces" are not very concerned about integration with the West (5-7%), nor are "leaders of military educational institutions" (2-5%). The situation has remained almost unchanged since September, except for an insignificant decrease in the role of the former groups and an increase in the role of the latter ones, which had no essential influence on their ranking.

The experts' estimations of Ukraine's foreign policy as a whole from the point of view of its stability, balance and predictability increased in December, 1997 compared with March, 1997. In general, the estimations on all three indices almost coincided (the estimation of predictability being a little lower) and were very close to the "medium" level, while in March they were close to the "low" level.

Against the background of the December 1997 estimation of Ukraine's international security, which could be considered comparatively safe (19.5% of the experts said that there was a threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity, 31.7% mentioned that "there is no such threat, but it can emerge at any moment" (total - 51.2%), anxiety about the situation in March, 1998 becomes especially noticeable - 40.5% said that there was a threat to territorial integrity, 29.7% stressing the probability of its emergence at any moment (total - 70.2%). This concern had almost reached the level of March, 1997 when the highest level of concern was registered: 31% of the experts stressed an actual presence of a threat, 51% - a probability of its emergence at any moment (total - 81%). In turn, the absence of such a threat and the presence of preconditions for preventing it was stressed by only 24.3% of the experts in the spring of 1998 (in March, 1997 - 14.3%, in December - 34.1%). 5.4% of the experts do not negate the presence of a threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity, but forecast its emergence in 1-2 years. None of the experts said that it might emerge in 3-5 years. In general, each of the last two variants did not gain more than 7-9%.

Nevertheless, in our opinion, this "level of anxiety" reflected the situation of the domestic-policy instability of the pre-election period in Ukraine in January-March, 1998 and the tension between the branches of power and political alignments (parties) to a greater extent than the actual increase of a threat. In other words, a worsening of the potential of resistance to negative external impacts and not an increase of these impacts themselves, occurred.

Therefore, the beginning of 1998 has received rather low experts' estimations, compared with the end of the previous year (forecast by UCPCCRS experts). A number of indices testifies to this. Thus, according to 20.5% of the experts, in January-March 1998 the condition of international security in Europe "has been getting worse", while in December only 2.5% thought so; 25.6% stressed that this condition "has been getting better (in December - 46.3%); those considering that this condition "remains unchanged" constituted 48.7%, almost as before (51.2% in December). Such a distribution of opinion resembles the beginning of 1997, when the condition of international security in Europe was estimated as follows: its improvement or worsening was stressed by 24.4% of the experts respectively, 41.5% saying that it remained unchanged.

In turn, in March 1998 the condition of the international security of Ukraine has also been "worsening". This is the opinion of 41% of the experts, while 12.8% think that it is improving, 43.6% deeming it unchanged. The December, 1997 results were 26.8%, 29.3% and 36.6% respectively, which was considered to be a good result compared to March, 1997, when adherents of the three standpoints constituted 9.5%, 52.4%, and 33.3% respectively. Further estimations in 1997 got better, in general, while in March, 1998 the situation to some extent resembled that of March, 1997. The same way, the level of international safeguards granted to Ukraine by other countries, which had been increasing during 1997, getting closer to the "medium" level, was in March, 1998 closer to being "low".

Thus, the coincidence of the tendencies of the alteration of the estimation (worsening) of the condition of security in Europe and in Ukraine testifies to the lowering of the level of the "historical optimism" of specialists in our country and to their concern about Ukraine's prospects, rather than to dangerous shifts in these spheres.

In providing Ukraine's international security, the leading role in the spring of 1998 is played by economic factors - 71.8% and also, by political factors - 30.8%. As before, the experts consider that the readiness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is getting worse (79.5%), with 0% thinking that it is getting better. The extent to which one could rely on the Armed Forces in providing national security has essentially decreased compared to 1997, when, according to the experts' estimations, the importance of the AF was gradually growing - in March, 1998 being closer to the "low" level. In the realization of its foreign-policy goals, Ukraine has to, to an extent greater than in December, 1997, rely on its allies, which first of all include Poland, the USA (the condition of bilateral relations with both is worsening, see below), the EU, the Baltic states, Germany, the Council of Europe and NATO. On the other hand, in the spring of 1998 Ukraine was subject to the dictates and expectations of other states or alignments to a "medium" extent, even if this was in conflict with its national interest.

However this index cannot be interpreted positively without reservations - it is also an indicator of ever growing sentiments of Ukraine's instability, its relegation to the "gray zone" of European and world policies.
Providing a general estimation of Ukraine's foreign policy according to such features as stability, deliberateness and predictability, the experts say that in March, 1998 it was close to "low". In the second half of 1997 these indices essentially increased compared to March 1997 and almost did not change during the year (being close to a "medium" estimation), while at the beginning of 1998 they roughly decreased again, to the level of March, 1997.

One could hope for improvement in the situation on condition of a reasonable structuralization of the newly elected Verkhovna Rada and more professional work on the part of its Committee for Foreign Affairs. (Let us recall that according to the Constitution the Verkhovna Rada is the main body in charge of foreign policy). The new leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should provide a positive impact. In any case, objective indices indicate that the replacement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs was not only desirable, but also necessary.

According to the experts' estimations, a permanent process of Ukraine's integration in Eastern or Western directions exists, the intensity of integration in one of these directions decreasing as integration in the other direction increases. Thus, in December 1997 the process of integration with Russia and the CIS, which was gaining in intensity until that time, essentially slowed (ranging between "slow" and "zero"), while the vice versa process of the integration with NATO, the EU, etc., became more intensive (closer to "medium"). However these fluctuations were short-lasting, because in March, 1998 the experts pointed out an essential increase in integration processes in the Eastern direction (between "medium" and "slow") and a slowing of integration in the Western direction (closer to "slow"). In addition, integration with the Black Sea region and CEE, which increased to some extent during 1997, has become less intensive (in the spring of 1998 the state of integration here is closer to "slow", especially in regard to CEE). Thus, the estimation of the state of the integration processes in the mentioned directions in March, 1998 ranged between "medium" and "slow", being closer to "slow" to this or that extent.

In the experts' opinions, in the spring of 1998, the present crisis in the CIS - its not being able to acquire effectiveness - either did not affect Ukraine's international situation (58% of the experts) or had a more positive than negative influence on Ukraine (32%). This estimation points out the prospective (desirable) directions of the country's integration efforts.

Among the Ukrainian political elite there are certain groups striving for integration in the western or in the eastern directions. Among the adherents of integration with Russia, up to uniting into a coherent state, the experts constantly mention "politicians of a pro-Russian orientation" (79.5% in March, 1998, 67-88% overall), and the "left-wing deputies of the Verkhovna Rada" (69.2% in March, 1998, 51-79% overall ). Less concerned are "regional leaders of the East and the South" (35.9% in March, 1998, 31-35% overall, 19% in December, 1997), "entrepreneurs from Ukrainian-Russian groups" (25% in March, 1998, 31-53% overall), "leaders of MIC enterprises oriented toward cooperation with Russia" (25.6% in March, 1998, 25-36% overall), "socially deprived strata of the population" (23.1% in March, 22-39% overall), "officers of the Armed Forces" (2.6% in March, 2-10% overall) and other groups (2.6% in March, 2-7% overall). The experts stress that "right-wing deputies of the Verkhovna Rada" (81.6% in March, 1998, 68-88% overall) are the main adherents of integration with the West, up to accession to NATO.

In regard to the estimation of the level of concern of the leaders of finance and the banking business, it is constantly and essentially fluctuating — from 28% to 66.7% in estimation of the experts. Thus, in December, 1997 this group was pointed out by 56.7% of the experts, while in March, 1998 - by 28.9% of the experts. The experts also stress a certain adherence to integration with the West among such groups as "the centrist deputies of the VR" - 26.3% in March, 1998 (30-40% overall), "medium-level businessmen" - 21.1% in March (26-35% overall), "the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the generals" - 18.4% in March (16-28% overall), "arms and specialized technologies manufacturers" - 13.2% in March (2-15% overall) "leaders of MIC enterprises" - 7.9% in March (4-7% overall). The groups of officers of the AF and heads of military educational institutions were not mentioned at all in March, 1998, although they had previously attracted certain attention (2-7%).

According to the experts' estimations, the situation regarding the external security of Ukraine became safer in June, 1998 compared to March, 1998, when the level of the experts' anxiety became considerable: in the summer only 15% of experts thought that a threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity existed (40.5% in March). At the same time, 50% still feel a tension and expect an "emergence of the threat at any moment" (29.7% in March). Thus, the anxiety about Ukraine's external security did not vanish, but to a certain extent became concealed. Only 15% of experts stressed that there was no evident threat and that all the preconditions to prevent it existed (24.3% in March). 7.5% and 12.5% respectively think "one should expect that a threat will emerge in 1-2 years" or "in 3-5 years".

In June, 1998, most experts estimated the condition of Ukraine's international security as "unchanged" - 65.9%. In March, 1998 such an opinion was shared by 43.6% of the experts. At the same time, the opinion that the condition of Ukraine's international security was "getting worse" was significant, 41% of experts saying so. In the summer of 1998 the number of adherents of this idea was more than twofold smaller - 17.1%. Those who thought that this condition is "getting better" constitute only 9.8% (in March, they constituted 12.8%). The experts' estimations also testify to the absence of any significant alterations in the condition of international security in Europe - 68.3%. Only 9.8% of the experts think that it is getting better (in March, 1998 this group was twice larger - 20.5%), while 19.5% of the experts consider that it is getting worse (25.6% in March).

Alongside this, the experts think that the level of international guaranties of Ukraine's security has been falling from the beginning of the 1998 and estimate it as close to being "low", although previously the estimations had been steadily growing and had almost reached the "medium" level. Among the crucial determinants of Ukraine's international security, as before, the experts first of all in the summer of 1998 mentioned economic factors (61%) followed by political factors (43.9%) and other factors (not more than 10%). In the same way, in the providing of Ukraine's defense capacity, the greatest role is played by economic factors (78%) in comparison with other factors. Accordingly, the overwhelming majority of the experts think that the readiness of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the summer of 1998 is still getting worse (70%, compared to 79.5% in March). In June, 1998 compared to March, 1998 the estimations of the extent to which Ukraine can rely on its Armed Forces in providing its national security increased, but they still ranged between "medium" and "low", now being closer to "medium", while in March they essentially decreased, coming closer to "low".

In general, in the summer of 1998 the experts consider the foreign policy of Ukraine to be more stable, deliberate and predictable compared with the spring of the same year. At the beginning of the year the indices related to these characteristics noticeably decreased, almost coming close to a "low" estimation. In June they almost reach the "medium" level. There are grounds to consider that the condition of these indices was positively influenced by the vigorous steps of the new leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and, probably even to a greater extent - by expectations connected with its further activities.

According to the experts' estimations, the Eastern and Western integration processes have turned in opposite directions in June, compared to corresponding vectors in March. This calls in question the very stability and deliberateness of Ukraine's foreign policy, because it is difficult to determine any certain trend. There are fluctuations of integration vectors (and thus - geopolitical orientations of the country), which have a short-term character (short amplitude).

The intensification of the process of Ukraine's integration in the Eastern direction - with Russia and the CIS, which was marked out in January- March, 1998, changed to the decline of this process in April-June, 1998. Let us emphasize, the last estimation of the condition of this process is close to being "zero", while in March it was very close to the "medium" level.

Instead of this, there is a certain intensification in the process of integration in the Western direction - with NATO, the EU, etc. In March, 1998, the index of this process was at the lowest level ever registered during the monitoring period, and in June, 1998 it is still estimated by the experts as "slow".

The most positive changes, compared to other directions, were taking place in the process of Ukraine's integration into the Black Sea region (the Black Sea Economic Cooperation - BSEC), the estimation of its rate having been constantly growing from the beginning of 1997, ranging between "medium" and "slow".

Instead of this was the intensity of integration of Ukraine into the Central-Eastern European region. Most experts estimate the rate of this process as "slow" in June, 1998.

We can conclude that the experts are right - their estimations create the feeling of a kind of vacuum around Ukraine. We should stress that its integration (in any direction) potential is by no means determined by the efforts of Ukrainian diplomacy, but is a direct result of the situation within the country - political, economic and social.

Among the Ukrainian political elite, as we mentioned above, there are certain groups which are adherents of Ukraine's integration either in the Western or in the Eastern directions.

Among those most interested in integration with Russia, up to uniting into a coherent state, the experts first of all mentioned in June, 1998 the politicians of a pro-Russian orientation - 70.7% (overall, during the latest 1.5 years this group gained 67-88%) and the left-wing deputies at the Verkhovna Rada - 61% (51-79% overall). Then come the "regional leaders of the East and the South" (31-36% overall), "entrepreneurs from Ukrainian-Russian groups" - their significance ranges between 25% and 53%, but they occupy the 3rd and 4th positions; and "socially deprived strata of population" (22-39% overall). Less important, according to the experts, is the group of the "leaders of MIC enterprises oriented toward cooperation with Russia" - 24.4% (25-36% in 1997-98 overall). Almost disinterested is the group of "officers of the Armed Forces" - 2.4% (2-10% overall). Other groups, which gained 2-7% in previous polls, were not mentioned.

Among the main adherents of integration with the West, up to accession to NATO, the experts first of all mentioned in June, 1998 right-wing deputies at the Verkhovna Rada - 87.8% (68-88% overall during the latest 1.5 years). After them, the experts always mention the group of the "leaders of finance and the banking business" - 48.8%, although the estimation of their concern is not stable. According to the experts, the groups of "medium businessmen" - 41.3% (21-35% overall) and "centrists in the Verkhovna Rada" - 39% (30-40% overall) are concerned about integration with the West. Besides the mentioned groups, the experts also pointed out the "leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the Generals staff" - 17.1% (16-28% overall), "arms and special technologies producers" - 14.6% (2-15% overall) and "leaders of MIC enterprises" - 4.9% (4-17% overall). Such groups as "officers of the Armed Forces" and "heads of military educational institutions" were not mentioned in June, 1998 at all, though previously they had attracted certain attention (2-7%).

The Domestic Determinants of National Security Policy

From March, 1997 until December, 1997 the experts gave a somewhat higher estimation of the current level of confidence in and influence of elite leaders on heads of state structures in charge of Ukraine's foreign and defense policies. In December the general level of confidence of elite leaders in the heads of the mentioned structures ranged between "medium" and "low", while in March, 1997 it was closer to "low". According to the experts' estimations, since March the level of influence of elite leaders on the structures in charge of foreign policy was somewhat higher than that on the structures in charge of Ukraine's defense policy. However despite the fact that since March the evaluation indices grew better (with a certain lowering in September), by December this difference remained unchanged. According to 1997 summing-up data, the general level of influence of elite leaders on heads of state structures in charge of Ukraine's foreign and defense policies could be evaluated as close to "medium", and in the case of foreign-policy structures - as equal to "medium", while in March it was close to "low".

The level of the military's support of state leadership policy had also been growing since March, but the growth was not significant. In December it ranged between "medium" and "low" (in March it was generally "low").

One could assume that the estimations connected with the status of the Armed Forces and the level of confidence in governmental officials in charge of the military sphere and military policy are of an imbalanced and subjective character. This can be explained by both the difficult problems of the Armed Forces as a whole and the vagueness of the prospects of reformation of the army. Thus, during 1991-1997 the Ukrainian Armed Forces were reduced by 400 000 persons, including 70 000 servicemen. This reduction is to continue in 1998, during which 17 000 servicemen are subject to release.

At the same time, the difficult situation of the army can also be explained by the lack of the financing of the Armed Forces during the last few years. For the first time in the last few years, the law "On the State Budget of Ukraine for 1998" provides for an increase of allotments to national defense by more than UAH 200 million - to the level of UAH 1 678 269 000. In 1998 they constitute 6.855% of budget allotments.

As for divergences among regions (the attitude of regional élites to the state leadership's policy, the level of divergences in situations of different regions of the country and the peculiarities of their general attitude to governmental policies), the experts' answers were ambiguous, but the opinion that these aspects remain unchanged was overwhelming - in June and December, 1997 36.6% of the experts adhered to this standpoint. In turn, 29-24% of those polled thought that regional divergences were "leveling", 27-19% regarded them as "deepening". In March and September, 1997, 45% and 56% of those polled considered that regional divergences remained unchanged, 19-14% thought that they were "leveling" and 29-19% regarded them as "deepening".

In March, 1998 a comprehensive lowering of the levels of confidence and influence of the most influential elite leaders in regard to the leaders of state structures in charge of Ukraine's foreign and defense policies was registered. In December 1997 these indices increased and were close to the "medium" level, while in the spring they were close or equal to the "low" level. The crisis of state power structures is also obvious in the sphere of objects of the monitoring.

The "military's support of policies of the leadership of the state" increased to some extent in December 1997, though not essentially, ranging between "medium" and "low". Ukraine's progress in the sphere of moving toward arms markets has led to the increase of chances of overcoming the current stagnation of the Ukrainian MIC. In March, 1998, 39% of the experts deemed the preconditions for it "medium" (compared to 26% in December, 1997), 44% - "low" (47%), 14% - zero (21%).

Pre-election uncertainty and the play of political forces affected the experts' optimism as for the prospects of the establishment of an effective system of civil control over Armed Forces' activities. 35% of the experts deem such prospects "medium" (21% in December, 1997), 49% - "low" (67% in December, 1997).

In regard to the divergences among regions in attitude to foreign policy, the number of experts who considered in March, 1998 that they are aggravating increased to 33.3% (compared to 19.5% in December 1997), while the share of those thinking that they are leveling decreased to 17.9% (24.4% in December). Almost as before, 38.5% of the experts (36.6% in December) deem them unchanged.

The indices of the elite's leaders' influence on and confidence in both the politicians responsible for foreign policy and those responsible for the defense policy of Ukraine decreased considerably in March, 1998, as mentioned above. In general, the estimations were almost equal to being "low". Alongside of this, the estimations of influence were a little higher than those of confidence (?!). In June, 1998 the level of influence and confidence of the leaders of élites increased to some extent in all indices and even reached the "medium" level. The experts estimate the level of influence on both the politicians in charge of the defense policy and those in charge of the foreign policy of Ukraine in the same way - between "medium" and "low". The estimations of confidence differ. The level of confidence of elite leaders in heads of state structures in charge of the foreign policy of Ukraine is higher than that of influence and is close to "medium". It is also higher than the level of confidence of elite leaders in heads of state structures in charge of the defense policy of Ukraine. The latter is lower than the level of influence and is close to "low".

Discrepancies between regions in the attitude to the foreign policy of Ukraine in June, 1998, according to 50% of the experts, "remain unchanged" (38.5% in March, 1998); only 12.5% think that they are "deepening" (three times fewer than in March - 33.3%) and 27.5% consider that they are "leveling" (17.9% in March). As before, 10% of experts do not have a certain standpoint. We assume that the opinion about the greater aggravation of discrepancies in the spring was grounded in the conditions of the pre-electoral campaign, when numerous discussions on the regions' attitudes to the country's geopolitical orientation took place. The mentioned discrepancies vanished as the elections were completed.

The Estimation of Bilateral Relations
with Other States and Alignments

The experts were unanimous in 1997 with respect to the countries relations with which should be developed in the first place. These are Russia, Germany, the USA and Poland. On the other hand, according to most experts, Ukraine's relations with these very countries had been developed most intensively. Such a situation was emphasized during the year for all the countries mentioned in the polls, except for Russia and Belarus'. In March, 1997 the experts placed Russia in first place (in June - in second) among the countries with which it would be most desirable for Ukraine to develop relations, but at the same time it was last among the 24 mentioned countries with which Ukraine's relations had been successfully and intensively developed. But in June, 1997 Russia occupied third place according to this criterion.

An intricate attitude of Ukrainian foreign policy circles toward Russia is caused by the absence of long-term euphoria arising out of the fact of the signing of a number of important documents in May, 1997. The course of relations at the state and governmental levels causes a careful and to a certain extent skeptical attitude of the experts toward the prospects of Ukrainian-Russian relations. In this regard, noteworthy on the one hand is the realization of the extreme importance of relations with Russia, and on the other hand, an understanding of the imbalance in the character of the achieved settlement of controversial matters, which at any moment can change into a new outburst of hatred. Among the experts, as well as among politicians (with the exception of those on the left), two main orientation groups predominate: the adherents of a gradual normalization of bilateral relations with Russia and skeptics who deem the establishment of normal, equal and mutually profitable relations with Russia to be almost impossible.

Belarus' was never mentioned as a country with which bilateral relations were successfully developed. According to the experts' estimations, in March, 1997 the development of relations was most successful with the USA, Poland, Germany, Italy and Georgia; in June - with Poland, Russia, the USA, Romania, Germany, Hungary and Moldova; in September - with Poland, the USA, Russia, Germany, Canada, Georgia, Israel and Romania; in December - with the USA, Poland, Russia, Canada, Germany, Georgia, the Netherlands and the Republic of Korea. The share of other countries in these indices was insignificant.

Thus, in June and September, 1997, Poland was the absolute leader among the countries according to estimations of the intensity and success of relations. The estimation of bilateral relations with it was highest compared with other countries during the year, except for March (3.90 according to a 5-point scale). One could say that the general rating of Poland began to increase from June. In September it was at its peak and in December, 1997 slowly declined. Thus, in June the evaluation of bilateral relations with this country increased from the March level to 4.13, in September - to 4.27, in December it decreased to 4.10 points. On the other hand, in March and June it occupied 2nd. place (52-53% of the experts) among the countries relations with which were successfully and intensively developed, while in June and September it held in 1st. place in this respect (61% and 73% of the experts respectively). A similar situation is observed at estimating Poland as Ukraine's ally in general and as a country Ukraine could rely on in the process of the reformation of the Armed Forces: in March and December it was mentioned as an ally by 43.9-48.8% of the experts (the 2nd. position) and by 26.8% (the 4th. and 3rd. positions) of the experts as a country Ukraine should cooperate with in the reformation of its Armed Forces; in June - 50% (2nd.) and 41% (2nd.) of the experts respectively; in September - 63.4% (1st.) and 40% (2nd.) of the experts respectively. The experts kept granting high estimation to the activities of Ukrainian diplomats in the international arena in relations with Poland - in March, 1997 - 3.31 points (1st.); in June and September - 4.03-3.95 (1st.); in December - 3.90 (2nd.).

As for Canada, with which Ukraine enjoyed its best bilateral relations in March, 1997 - 4.13 points according to a 5-point scale (1st. position), in June it lost its rating of a priority partner - 3.80 points (5th.) and began to regain it from September - 4.07 (3rd,). In December, 1997 it almost managed to achieve its former position - 4.07 (2nd. after Poland). This was not surprising because in December Canada shared 3rd. place (25%) with Russia (after the USA and Poland) among the countries relations with which had been lately successfully and intensively developed. In September Canada was in the 4th. position (18%), in June - the 9th. (7%), in March the 6th. (17%).

According to a direct estimation, Ukraine's relations with Poland are the best, while by other indices the USA is the absolute leader, especially in March and December, 1997. According to the estimation of bilateral relations, in December, 1997 the USA occupied only 3rd. place (in September - 4th. place). As for the estimation of the success of real actions of Ukrainian diplomacy in relations with the USA, it especially increased in June and September (3.50 and 3.60 points respectively) and was a little lower in March and December (3.10 and 3.29 points). Achievements of Ukrainian diplomacy in the development of relations with the USA were estimated as 2nd. in March, 3rd. in June, 5th. in September and 4th. in December. However, as mentioned before, in March and December the USA was first among the countries relations with which were most intensively developed (58-61% of the experts) and by the end of the year became first among the countries developing relations with which was the priority of Ukraine's foreign policy (80 and 90% of the experts in September and December). This coincides with the data that 41-63% of the experts regarded the USA as the top-rating ally of Ukraine, especially with respect to the reformation of the Armed Forces (51-63%). It was only in September that Poland attracted greater attention as an ally, in other cases it followed the USA.

Despite the shifts in rankings, the first five countries having the highest estimation of bilateral relations with Ukraine remained unchanged during 1997. Other than Poland, Canada and the USA, included are the Baltic countries (3.80-4.23 points) and Georgia (3.79-4.05 points). The Baltic countries had a high estimation of bilateral relations with Ukraine compared with other countries in June and September (2nd. place), Ukrainian diplomatic activities in this direction also having been highly estimated in September (3rd. place after Poland and the UN) - 3.68 points. Furthermore, the Baltic states were mentioned as an important ally - after the USA and Poland (29-44% of experts during the year), especially in September (37%) and in December (44%), except for June (21.1%).

6th. place, with almost no distance from 5th. place, is occupied by Germany (3.95-3.85 points), in March, and in June - 8th place. (3.63-3.55 points). According to the experts' estimations, Ukrainian diplomacy acted in this direction more successfully from the start of 1997. In general, the experts do not estimate Germany too highly as an ally, though higher than at the beginning of the year (from 19.5% in March to 26.8% in December). This country is especially regarded as one Ukraine could rely on in the reformation of its Armed Forces.

The following places are occupied by countries which, according to the experts' estimations, are able to move forward periodically, depending on the latest circumstances. Thus, in March 6-13th. places were occupied by: Israel, Hungary, Germany, Slovakia, Italy, the Czech Republic, Moldova, Kazakhstan - 3.79-3.47 points; in June: Moldova, Azerbaijan, Hungary, Israel, Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Kazakhstan - 3.69-3.33 points; in September: Germany, Hungary, Azerbaijan, Moldova, the Czech Republic, Israel, Great Britain, the Republic of Korea - 3.95-3.59 points; in December: Germany, the Czech Republic, the Benelux countries, Hungary, Finland, Israel, Azerbaijan, the Republic of Korea - 3.95-3.40 points.

The final positions in the list of 36 are occupied by such countries as the Middle East and Persian Gulf countries - 28-31 places (2.91-3.07 points); France - 30-34 places, in December —24th place; Latin America countries - 31-36 places (2.59-2.97); Belarus' - 33-36 places, in June - 17th (2.50-3.18 points); Romania - 31-35 places, in June - 16th (2.14-3.23); the Asian and Pacific Ocean region countries - 34-36 places (2.68-2.85 points); Russia - 35-36 places, in June - 25th. (1.56-3.06 points).

Thus, according to the experts' estimations, relations between Ukraine and Russia are the worst in 1997, although in March and June Russia occupied first place among the four countries with which developing relations was the priority of Ukraine's foreign policy. In September it was 3rd. after the USA and Germany, in December 2nd. after the USA. On the other hand, however, relations with Russia had been comparatively intensively developed from June, 1997: in June it was in 2nd. place according to this index (52%), in September (35%) and in December (25%) it shared the 3rd. position with Canada, after Poland and the USA, although in March the experts stressed that it was last in this position (2%). Moreover, the estimation of the success of Ukrainian diplomacy in relations with Russia (2.74 points in December, 1997) was higher than in September (2.39 points) and in March (2.07 points), though somewhat lower than in June. Certain differences in the experts' estimations were, surely, caused by a number of agreements signed between Ukraine and Russia at the end of May.
Alluding to these events, in June, 1997 it was suggested to the experts to estimate the extent of the correspondence to Ukraine's national interest of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation of 31 May 1997 and the agreements concerning the problems of the division of the Black Sea Fleet. According to the results of the poll, their average estimations ranged between "medium" and "low". Among the main defects of the Treaty on cooperation signed by L. Kuchma and B. Yeltsin the experts mentioned 1) its declarative character (41.5%) and 2) the submission of Ukraine's strategic interests to Russia (29.3%). 53.7% of experts stressed the small extent of its effect on positive changes in bilateral relations; 19.5% deemed the extent of this effect "zero", 22% - "medium" and only 4.9% regarded it as "high". Among the main defects of the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet, most experts emphasized: 1) the preservation of the dislocation of foreign military force on the territory of Ukraine (63.4%), 2) the preservation of the potential threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity (36.6%), 3) non-correspondence to the orientation of Ukraine toward integration into European security structures (26.8%). 36.6% of experts noted that these agreements corresponded to Ukraine's national interest to a "medium" extent, 36.6 - "low", 18.4% - "zero" and only 8.4% - "high". In December, 1997, in estimating the main foreign policy results of the year most experts (62.5%) stressed the positive character of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation of 31 May 1997. On the other hand, according to the experts' estimations, the rating of Russia and the CIS countries as Ukraine's allies decreased almost twofold compared to March, 1997 (24% and 22% respectively), totaling in December, 1997 only 12%. However during 1997 Russia was constantly mentioned after the USA, Poland and Germany as a country Ukraine could rely on in the reformation of its Armed Forces, though this opinion was approximately twice rarer than in March of the same year.

In estimating the efforts of professional diplomats in the sphere of the realization of Ukraine's national interests in 1997, the experts ear-marked four most successful directions of cooperation. These are relations with Poland, the UN, NATO and the USA. According to the criterion of the success of Ukrainian diplomacy, the mentioned countries and international organization received, on a 5-point scale, the following marks: 3.10-2.95 in March; 4.03-3.50 in June; 3.95-3.46 in September (3.29 for the USA); 4.10-3.60 in December. Moreover, compared with other states, a high evaluation was given to the success and effectiveness of relations with the Baltic states and Germany, especially in March and September: 2.95 and 2.93 in March respectively; 3.28 and 3.23 in June; 3.68 and 3.24 in September; 3.45 and 3.50 in December. The least effective directions, which had been estimated by the experts at "3" during the year, were relations with the Northern European countries (from 2,60 points in March to 2.93 at the end of the year), the Middle East and Persian Gulf countries (from 2.56 to 2.73 points in March-September and 2.61 in December), the Asian and Pacific region countries (2.30-2.63 points), the Central and South America countries (2.41 in March; from 2.13 in June to 2.56 at the end of the year), relations with Russia (2.07-2.74 points, 3.13 in June). It is necessary to indicate that since June, against the background of the flights and falls of other countries' ratings, a gradual growth of the general rating of Ukrainian diplomacy's effectiveness in all these directions was observed.

As for relations with the CIS as a whole, with European structures (the EU, etc.) and with international financial institutions (the IMF, the World Bank, the EBRD), in June, 1997 a noticeable growth in the positive estimation of Ukrainian diplomats' activities in these directions, compared with March, was observed. The situation grew worse in September and improved somewhat in December, 1997. The experts' estimations of Ukrainian diplomats' activities in these directions stood at less than "3" points in March and September and essentially grew in June and December, exceeding "3". Such a curve, though with other figures, could be seen in several directions, in particular in relations with Russia, the USA, NATO and the UN.

The growth of the positive impression of governmental diplomacy in relations with international financial institutions seemed most paradoxical, especially taking into account the actual crisis in relations between the Government of Ukraine and the IMF during 1997. First of all this concerned the stoppage of crediting under the Stand-by Program due to the Verkhovna Rada's having failed to adopt the budget for 1997 in a timely fashion. Second, this concerned the refusal of the IMF Board of Directors to grant Ukraine financial assistance under the EFF Program. Third, this concerned an actual blocking of loans under Stand-by in the second half of 1997 due to non-fulfillment by Ukraine of obligations concerning economic liberalization and entrepreneurship deregulation set forth in the Memorandum on Cooperation between the Government of Ukraine and the IMF.

In turn, the effectiveness of the Verkhovna Rada's Committee for Foreign Affairs and Links with the CIS was estimated as "low", as were the activities of the VR Committee for Defense and State Security, although the experts considered that the work of these Committees had become better to some extent, compared with March, 1997.

At the same time, it is necessary to note that although the activities of the two Committees had no essential public response, it was the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs and Relations with the CIS that had to defend Ukraine's interests at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of European with respect to the abolition of capital punishment. This issue was, in particular, accomplished with incorrectness or even the absence of any correct and true information from executive power bodies concerning the real situation of exercising death sentences in Ukraine. As a result, a danger of the stoppage of Ukraine's participation in the activities of PACE and other agencies of the Council of Europe appeared.

Among the countries with which the development of relations would be desirable for Ukraine, four states are constantly mentioned - Russia, the USA, Germany, and Poland. In December, 1997 Russia (78%) occupied second place after the USA (80%), and in March, 1998 - in a vice versa fashion, the USA (72%) follows Russia (80%). However the changes are not significant. Germany and Poland gained accordingly, 62% and 41% in March 1998, and 73% and 50% in December 1997. According to the experts, other countries do not play such a significant role for Ukraine. Adhering to the recognized priorities (or vice versa - determining priorities according to this index) Ukraine in January-March, 1998 developed relations with the very four mentioned countries most successfully and intensively. First place in this regard is occupied by Poland (58%), second - by Russia (46%), third by the USA (33%) and Germany (33%). At the end of 1997 the USA (58%) was first, Poland was second (53%), Russia and Canada - third (25%), Germany and Georgia - fourth (23%). Lately, Korea came closer to these countries according to the success and intensity of relations (24%) (AutoZAZ-DAEWOO business!); Canada was not mentioned in March, 1998 while Georgia and the Baltic states occupied the fifth position (12%). Other countries either failed to gain more than 8%, or were not mentioned at all.