Central Europe and the Baltic States

According to the founding fathers of geopolitics, Ukraine belongs to the countries grouped along the Baltic-Black Sea belt ("the axis of Europe"). The stability of the entire Euro-Atlantic system significantly depends on these countries. They today determine and will continue to determine the state and structure of European security for decades to come. These are the Baltic countries, Poland, Ukraine, Belarus', Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania. According to H.Mackinder, the strong strategic positions and influence of these countries enable the establishment of domination over the "Heartland" (that is, the heart of Eurasia) and the world in general.

It is these countries that are central in discussions about NATO's expansion. It is over these countries that a secret fierce struggle is currently being waged between countries of the Alliance (primarily the US) and Russia. NATO has decided to accept Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into the Alliance. Russia has established total political and military domination in Belarus'. As of yet the fate of other countries remains undetermined. The beginning of the process of the integration into the EC of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovenia was an extremely important signal of the West for countries of the region that were not included in the first round of NATO expansion.

Ukraine occupies a key position on the Baltic-Black Sea axis. This is unanimously agreed upon both by proponents of the Euro-Atlantic idea and by proponents of the Eurasian idea. Ukraine's geographical position, however, at the extreme eastern flank of Euro-Atlantic civilization has not only its pluses, but also its minuses. On the one hand, Ukraine has all the bases to be considered the cornerstone of Europe's security system. It is not accidental that at one time British Defense Minister M. Rifkind stressed the desirability of NATO's expansion to Ukraine's eastern border.

On the other hand, a real danger exists (which is caused by the activity, or more correctly, by the inactivity of Ukraine's ruling élite) of the transformation of Ukraine into a "gray zone" between NATO and the RF (the Tashkent Treaty). The accelerated integration of Ukraine into Europe and the European culture (rather than into European structures) represents a real and effective thwarting of this danger.

The intensive development of partnership and cooperation with countries of CE and the Baltic takes on a decisive meaning for the acceleration of the process of European integration. This is so because of a number of reasons (economic first of all) Ukraine is not yet ready to become a full-fledged partner of western European countries. In their turn the Baltic countries and CE are wholeheartedly interested in the development of relations with Ukraine and even more so in its comprehensive support. They fully understand that that the existence of an independent and democratic Ukraine is exclusively important for their own national security and the support of full-fledged sovereignty. This factor gained special significance after "the fall of Minsk" in the light of the clear tendency toward "the growth of political instability in Moscow".

Poland is actively striving for the role of the promoter of Ukraine's interests in the new Europe. Poland feels that this role will, first, significantly accelerate its own entry into the European community, and second, that it will qualitatively increase the influence and authority of both countries in the international arena. As Leshek Balcerowicz has fairly stressed, Poland has nothing to go to Europe with without Ukraine, but the presence of both central European countries in the world will significantly increase the influence of each of them.

In large measure this also applies to the Baltic countries. They have reconsidered their "separatist" views vis-à-vis other post-Soviet countries (Ukraine at least) and have realistically measured their possibilities and deadlines for joining NATO and the EU. As a result, the Baltic countries have actively begun to support the idea of the establishment and in the future of the formalization of a Baltic-Black Sea alliance that would include Warsaw and Kyiv. Growing cooperation in the spheres of politics, economics, communications, and transportation objectively corresponds to the national interests of all countries of the potential alliance and can significantly ease and accelerate the processes of the transformation of their economies and of their integration into European structures.

Exclusively economic factors also represent a powerful stimulus for the development of Ukraine's relations with countries of CE, especially with those who stand in line for entry into the EU at the beginning of the next century. The Czech Republic (with a 55% per capita annual income compared with the EU average) Hungary (37%), Slovenia (59%), and Poland (31%) are seriously interested in developing economic cooperation with Ukraine. Ukraine is one of the most promising markets for these countries, and the entry of their products onto this accessible market is comparatively easy. Other priority countries for Ukraine are Austria and Croatia.

In its turn, by developing cooperation with countries of CE and by supporting their entry into the EU and NATO, Ukraine can expect to receive quicker full-fledged membership in the CEI and CEFTA. In addition, such cooperation and common borders with new NATO and EU countries will in large measure increase Ukraine's own security and will stimulate the process of its integration into these structures.

Effective close partnership and cooperation with countries of CE is thus a necessary precondition and important intermediate stage in Ukraine's entry into the space of European civilization.

The situation as it stands in CE today is generally conducive for such partnership and cooperation. The political éites of the region's countries are decisively intensifying the democratization of socio-political relations and are supporting the course of market reforms. The region's economic situation is on the whole stable, disregarding certain difficulties connected with the reform of the social spheres of societies and with the introduction of norms of socially oriented economics.

Reduction of the armed forces continues. A system of civil control over the military is being introduced. The foreign policies of regional states adhere to basic OSCE principles and to other norms of good-neighborly relations.

The support of western states and international institutions significantly promotes the democratic orientations of CE states. Possibilities for future membership in organizations such as NATO and the EU force governments to adhere to the demands of these organizations concerning the reform of all spheres of life according to the principles accepted in developed democratic countries.

On the other hand, a characteristic feature of the situation is the crisis in general regional integrative processes. In this respect the slow pace of the Vishegrad group's activity can be mentioned, as well as a cautious attitude to the Ukrainian initiative to create security zones in Central and Eastern Europe, etc. The development of border cooperation does not receive adequate government support. Leading regional states concentrate their political efforts in the western integrative direction, devoting themselves to the processes of entering NATO and the European Union. And although the West is in all ways attempting to intensify regional cooperation by involving CE states in joint projects and by stressing the political importance of regional cooperation, this has not pushed Central Europeans to start their own potent political and economic initiatives.

In the nearest future this can lead to a certain moral isolation of Ukraine. The priority of relations with Ukraine will be more declared than upheld by serious material and intellectual support. Moreover, during negotiations concerning CE states joining the European Union the latter will demand from the candidates an increase over the control (customs, visa, etc.) of their eastern borders. A real, although temporary, danger of the deceleration (or even reduction) of goods turnover and cultural exchange between CE states and Ukraine exists.

In these conditions the realization of the concept of Ukraine's European integration using a "Central European base" becomes complicated. This is so not only because of the reorientation of close neighbors' priorities, but also because of the fact that the "lobby" efforts of, for example, Poland to promote the realization of Ukraine's national interests will not carry sufficient weight and authority in the Euro-community.
Another negative factor that will hinder the activation of Ukraine's relations with CE countries is the continuously widening gap between the above in the rates of the attainment of results in reform efforts. Ukraine's permanent lagging behind regional countries can develop into chronic backwardness. The general detraction of Ukraine's importance as a reliable and effective partner will be the result.

Rapid adaptation by CE states to the principles and norms of the European community will complicate Ukraine's coming closer to these states, primarily in the economic realm. An absence of sufficient resources will render impossible the introduction of large joint projects with companies/states of CE, and will transform Ukraine into a secondary partner in the realization of regional initiatives.

The dynamic development of CE states combined with the continuous decline of the Ukrainian economy will make business circles of neighboring countries see in Ukraine only a market of cheap labor and consumers who are satisfied with cheap low quality goods of Eastern European manufacture.

The state's economic backwardness will have a negative influence on the perspectives for Ukraine's political leadership in the region. A weak in economic and sociopolitical spheres Ukraine will not be able to conduct an active and, more importantly, resultative foreign policy directed at the real (rather than declared) intensification of regional integration, not to say anything about the realization of projects such as the representation of CE interests in the Security Council of the UN, for instance.

Ukraine's policy in the Central European direction should be primarily directed toward the overcoming of the state's isolation from European integrative processes, and toward the prevention of earning "secondary roles" in the strategic priorities of CE states. In this Ukraine should build upon the interest of Central Europeans in stabilizing their eastern borders. In the economic sphere worth stressing would be the realization of joint business and production projects with regional states. Interstate projects directed toward the development of transportation infrastructures, communication networks, etc. are also possible. New impulse should be applied to the idea of the creation of new "Euro-regions" and to the expansion of the sphere of activity of existent interstate creations (the Carpathian Euro-region, the "Buh" Euro-region). Significantly more attention should be paid to the processes of cultural, informational and educational exchange with CE states.

Ukraine and Belarus'. The legal base of bilateral relations between Ukraine and Belarus' today numbers fifty treaties and agreements, the most important of which is the Treaty on Friendship, Neighborly Relations and Cooperation. Ukraine-Belarus' relations are developing on an increasing scale. The amount of trade turnover is on the increase, relations in the scientific-technical sphere are resultative, cultural exchange is continuing, etc. In the last while the turnover in goods between the two states has significantly increased - in 1996 - almost twofold. The issue concerning the signing of a Treaty on the State Border, and concerning the cooperation of border regions remains actual. Also important is the essentiality of the resolution of the problems concerning interstate debts, and of the principle of the right of ownership.

A number of Ukraine-Belarus' documents were signed in 1997-1998, including the International Program for Long-Term Economic Cooperation of the Two Countries for the Period 1998-2007. Also, both states underlined their readiness to develop cooperation in the production sphere, to stimulate the completion of joint investment projects and to create Belarus'-Ukraine financial and industrial groups. The question of the minimization of the aftermath of the Chornobyl catastrophe is important for both countries.

Cooperation with Belarus' on the issue of the border is developing steadily. Thirty cross-points exist on the 953 km. Ukraine-Belarus' border. Destabilizing factors on the border include: active attempts of illegal migrants to use Ukrainian and Belarusian territories for the purposes of penetrating into Central and West-European countries; the intensification of the criminal situation in the border regions of Ukraine; the growing flow through CIS borders of citizens with trade-speculative purposes. Belarus' is especially interested in cooperation in the transportation sector, particularly in relation to the necessity to renew river transportation and freight traffic in the Black Sea direction with the use of Ukrainian ports as the next stage.

The Black Sea Region