State Sponsor: Implications

Designating countries that repeatedly support international terrorism (i.e., placing a country on the "terrorism list") imposes four main sets of U.S. Government sanctions:

1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales.

2. Controls over exports of dual use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist list country's military capability or ability to support terrorism.

3. Prohibitions on economic assistance.

4. Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including:

• Requiring the United States to oppose loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions.

• Lifting diplomatic immunity to allow families of terrorist victims to file civil lawsuits in U.S. courts.

• Denying companies and individuals tax credits for income earned in terrorist list countries.

• Denial of duty-free treatment for goods exported to the United States.

• Authority to prohibit any U.S. person from engaging in a financial transaction with a terrorist list government without a Treasury Department license.

• Prohibition of Defense Department contracts above $100,000 with companies controlled by terrorist list states.

An Informal Watchlist

There is utility in drawing to Congress' attention countries that do not currently qualify for inclusion in the terrorism list but where added scrutiny may be warranted. It would reflect legitimate concerns of those in the intelligence and policy community and might serve as an informal warning mechanism to countries that their activities are being scrutinized. For example, the State Department warned Pakistan in January 1993 that it was under ''active continuing review" to determine whether it should be placed on the terrorism list. When the list came out in April 1993, Pakistan was not on it. A similar warning was issued to Pakistan in January 2000. Sudan was also warned that it was being subjected to special review prior to its being placed on the terrorism list in August 1993.

In 2000, some informally discussed candidates for such a list include (1) Afghanistan, which is characterized as "a training ground and base of operations" for worldwide terrorist activities. Concerns are that Islamic fundamentalist terrorists linked to numerous international plots continue to train and operate out of the country and/or enter or exit with impunity, and more specifically that the Taliban continues to offer sanctuary to Usama Bin Laden and his associated terror networks; (2) Pakistan - Pakistan has tolerated terrorists living and moving freely within its territory; supported groups that engage in violence in Kashmir; and is "providing the Taliban with material, fuel, funding, technical assistance, and military advisers;" (3) Lebanon -ongoing concern exists over terrorist groups operating with impunity from there, often under Syrian protection, in areas ostensibly controlled by the Government of Lebanon; and (4) Yemen - despite growing military cooperation and assistance in the U.S.S. Cole bombing investigation, Yemen, a nation where a thriving kidnapping industry flourishes in remote areas, remains a safe haven for international terrorist groups with the Government of Yemen, apparently unable "to discourage the terrorist presence in Yemen." There is a growing concern in U.S. policy circles that Chechnya may increasingly become a magnet for Islamic radicals. However, concern exists that "increased radicalization of Islamist populations connected to the Chechnya conflict would encourage violence and spread instability elsewhere in Russia and beyond." Concerns also remain that militant Iranian elements and militants linked to Usama Bin Ladin remaining in the territory of Nations of the former Yugoslavia may resort to terrorist violence.

"Congressional Research Service " 2000

Major International Terrorist

Organizations

1. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) a.k.a. Fatah Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, and Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims.

Description: International terrorist organization led by Sabri al-Banna. Split from PLO in 1974. Made up of various functional committees, including political, military, and financial.

Activities: Has carried out terrorist attacks in twenty countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons. Targets include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul and the Pan Am flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in Greece in July 1988. Suspected of assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Lyad and PLO security chief Abu Hul in Tunis in January 1991. ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994 and has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative there. Has not attacked Western targets since the late 1980s.

Strength: A few hundred plus limited overseas support structure.

 Location/Area of Operation: Al-Banna relocated to Iraq in December

1998, where the group maintains a presence. Has an operational presence in Lebanon, including in several Palestinian refugee camps. Financial problems and internal disorganization have reduced the group's activities and capabilities. Authorities shut down the ANO's operations in Libya and Egypt in1999. Has demonstrated ability to operate over wide area, including the Middle East, Asia, and Europe.

External Aid: Has received considerable support, including safe haven, training, logistic assistance, and financial aid from Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987), in addition to close support for selected operations.

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

Description: The ASG is the smallest and most radical of the Islamic separatist groups operating in the southern Philippines. Some ASG members have studied or worked in the Middle East and developed ties to Mujahedin while fighting and training in Afghanistan. The group split from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1991 under the leadership of Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police on 18 December 1998. Press reports place his younger brother, Khadafi Janjalani, as the nominal leader of the group, which is composed of several factions.

Activities: Engages in bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and extortion to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern Philippines heavily populated by Muslims. Raided the town of Ipil in Mindanao in April 1995 - the group's first large-scale action - and kidnapped more than 30 foreigners, including a U.S. citizen, in 2000.

Strength: Believed to have about 200 core fighters, but more than 2,000 individuals motivated by the prospect of receiving ransom payments for foreign hostages allegedly joined the group in August.

Location/Area of Operation: The ASG primarily operates in the southern Philippines with members occasionally traveling to Manila, but the group expanded its operations to Malaysia this year when it abducted foreigners from two different resorts.

External Aid: Probably receives support from Islamic extremists in the Middle East and South Asia.

Armed Islamic Group (GIA).

Description: An Islamic extremist group, the GIA aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The GIA began its violent activities in 1992 after Algiers voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) - the largest Islamic opposition party - in the first round of legislative elections in December 1991.

Activities: Frequent attacks against civilians and government workers. Between 1992 and 1998 the GIA conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation. Since announcing its campaign against foreigners living in Algeria in 1993, the GIA has killed more than 100 expatriate men and women - mostly Europeans - in the country. The group uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats. The GIA hijacked an Air France flight to Algiers in December 1994. In late 1999 several GIA members were convicted by a French court for conducting a series of bombings in France in 1995. The Salafi Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) splinter faction appears to have eclipsed the GIA since approximately 1998 and is currently assessed to be the most effective remaining armed group inside Algeria. Both the GIA and GSPC leadership continue to proclaim their rejection of President Bouteflika's amnesty, but in contrast to the GIA, the GSPC has stated that it limits attacks on civilians. The GSPC's planned attack against the Paris - Dakar Road Rally in January 2000 demonstrates, however, that the group has not entirely renounced attacks against high-profile civilian targets.

Strength: Unknown; probably several hundred to several thousand.

Location/Area of Operation: Algeria.

External Aid: Algerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad, many of whom reside in Western Europe, provide financial and logistic support. In addition, the Algerian government has accused Iran and Sudan of supporting Algenan extremists.

4. Aum Supreme Truth (Aum) a.k.a. Aum Shinrikyo, Aleph.

 Description: A cult established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, the Aum aimed to take over Japan, then the world. Approved as a religious entity in 1989 under Japanese law, the group ran candidates in a Japanese parliamentary election in 1990. Over time the cult began to emphasize the imminence of the end of the world and stated that the United States would initiate Armageddon by starting World War III with Japan. The Japanese government revoked its recognition of the Aum as a religious organization in October 1995, but in 1997 a government panel decided not to invoke the Anti-Subversive Law against the group, which would have outlawed the cult. In 2000, Fumihiro Joyu took control of the Aum following his three-year jail sentence for perjury. Joyu was previously the group's spokesman and Russia Branch leader. Under Joyu's leadership the Aum changed its name to Aleph and claims to have rejected the violent and apocalyptic teachings of its founder.

Activities: On 20 March 1995, Aum members simultaneously released the chemical nerve agent sann on several Tokyo subway trains, killing twelve persons and injuring up to 6,000. (Recent studies put the number of persons who suffered actual physical injuries closer to 1,300, with the rest suffering from some form of psychological trauma.) The group was responsible for other mysterious chemical accidents in Japan in 1994. Its efforts to conduct attacks using biological agents have been unsuccessful. Japanese police arrested Asahara in May 1995, and he remained on trial, facing seventeen counts of murder at the end of 2000. Since—1997 the cult continued to recruit new members, engage in commercial enterprise, and acquire property, although the cult scaled back these activities significantly in 2000 in response to public outcry. The cult maintains an Internet homepage.

Strength: The Aum's current membership is estimated at 1,500 to 2,000 persons. At the time of the Tokyo subway attack, the group claimed to have 9,000 members in Japan and up to 40,000 worldwide.

Location/Area of Operation: The Aum's primary membership is located in Japan, but a residual branch comprising an unknown number of followers has surfaced in Russia. External Aid: None.