B) The State of the CIS and its Future Perspectives

The CIS, as a union of 12 post-Soviet states emerged according to the Treaty of Minsk, the Declaration of Alma-Ata, and the Minutes of the Treaty of Minsk, after the disintegration of the USSR. During its inception it was defined that the Commonwealth is to be built according to the principles of international law. Membership in the CIS is voluntary and each member has the right to suspend or to withdraw its membership. The bodies of the CIS have purely consultative and coordinative functions.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the creation of the CIS in 1991 represented only the beginning of a complicated flow of integrative and disintegrative processes within the territory of the last world empire. The CIS proved to be a politically and economically incapable and unstable structure. The ineffectiveness of the CIS's functioning is determined by the contradictory nature inherent in the concept of its existence. The CIS in fact, appeared as a mechanism for solving the contradictions that came into being under Soviet conditions between the union center and the periphery, made up of Soviet republics, during the time of "perestroika".

The struggle between centrifugal and centripetal tendencies of development led to the creation of new independent states with their own understanding of their national interests. The function of the "center" was appropriated by one of the newly created states, the Russian Federation, which declared itself to be the USSR's sole successor and in time began to direct its politics toward the restoration of a new union, that is, to once again "gather territories" around Moscow. The growing bi-polarization of CIS relations along the "center-periphery" axis has effectively led to the formation of two blocs of states that have opposing views on the role, functions, organization, and future of the CIS.

The functions of the CIS and difficulties in their fulfillment. On the whole, the creation of the CIS can be regarded as historically justified at the stage of the formation of the new states, but at present, when this process can be seen to be complete, the existence of the CIS becomes problematic. In order to investigate the positive and negative sides of CIS activity during the past seven years an analysis of its actual functions and goals should be made. However, it is worth highlighting that each function also has a double nature (centrifugal and centripetal) in keeping with the different conceptional schemes of viewing the CIS:

a) The cultural-historical function is based on a common past and shows itself in the maintenance of a feeling of solidarity among post-Soviet nations, which had been formed during a prolonged common existence within the Russian Empire and the USSR. A certain "civic-minded" unity also exists among CIS states, marked by similar systems of education, the use of the Russian language, familial ties, etc. Due to the creation of the CIS the shock to populations of post-Soviet states caused by the dissolution of the USSR was lighter than would otherwise have been the case. The regime of free movement across (new) borders was maintained, as was the recognition of educational documents and scholarly degrees, the maintenance of the compounds of a common informational realm, etc. On the other hand, the RF's "civic-minded - informational" hegemony (demands for the protection of the "Russian-speaking population", the introduction of dual citizenship, the tendentiousness of the Russian mass media, etc.) has became widespread in post-Soviet space. The fact that the Russian language has been established as the only working language of the Commonwealth can hardly be termed fair.

b) The international-law function. The creation of the CIS promoted a more civilized way of solving the problems connected with the transformation of the former Soviet republics into independent states (the mechanism of "divorce"). The completion of this process will occur as a result of the strengthening of national states, their entry into the international arena, the signing of bilateral agreements with the RF, etc. At this point the international-law function of the Commonwealth in its present state will lose its sense and will have to obtain different obligations.

As matters stand, the Commonwealth, as a union of independent states, is gradually transforming itself into a pro-Russian supra-state structure. Despite the fact that according to the terms of the Treaty of Belovezhsk, Minsk was established as the capital of the CIS, its main components and structures abide in Moscow. The RF in all manners attempts to establish in the mind of the international community its right to dominate on the territory of the CIS. Proof of this is its attempt to establish status for the CIS in the UN and to promote its interests in an unrestrained fashion under the aegis of this organization. Wide propagandist measures have been taken by Russia in order to turn world opinion away from the new independent states and to form a negative image of them.

The formation of a ramified structure of CIS components can be viewed as the result of the existence of old Soviet stereotypes of bureaucratic consciousness. Principles of the Soviet system were carried through into the Commonwealth's activity, which in large part contributed to its ineffectiveness. Commonwealth bodies' resolutions are in fact non-obligatory in nature and each member-state complies only with those resolutions that are beneficial and in agreement with its national demands of law. Thus Ukraine, for instance, is only an associate member of the CIS, is not a signatory to the Statute of the CIS, does not participate in its customs and payment unions, takes no part in bodies of military cooperation, and holds the position of observer in its Inter-Parliamentary Assembly.

c) The Economic function. In the creation of the CIS it was important to maintain the rational economic ties that had been formed in the conditions of the former singular national economic plan. The complementary nature and interdependence of member-states of the CIS do exist, as do common problems in the carrying out of economic transformations that could be solved in a coordinated manner.

But the expected hopes for the creation of an effective model of economic cooperation have not been fulfilled. Russian domination has become fixed in the economic components of the CIS. The Customs Treaty in many cases does not function and significant protectionalist barriers discriminative toward members of the Commonwealth exist in Russian trade with CIS states. The RF uses the fact of the dependence of the economies of the CIS states on Russian supplies either for the purpose of increasing its prices much higher than world levels or for the purpose of political pressure. All the above-mentioned will force many Commonwealth states to search for alternative solutions for their economic development.

d) The military-political function and security issues. Common elements of military leadership and of the military infrastructures of strategic forces were maintained during the first stage of the CIS's existence. With the development of national armed forces, the transfer of nuclear weapons from Ukraine and Kazakhstan to the RF, and the settling of the problem surrounding the Black Sea fleet, this function gradually disappeared. Attempts at its reanimation by way of the Tashkent Treaty were unsuccessful, in practice military cooperation took on the form of bilateral cooperation. The RF took upon itself the function of defending the external borders of Commonwealth states (except Ukraine), but with the establishment of national border troops of CIS member-states this function will also gradually disappear.

Supporters of the reintegration of post-Soviet space based on the principle of Russian domination consider that without a Russian military-political presence interethnic and interdenominational conflicts will inevitably occur in the new independent states. However, these cases have largely emerged as a result of Russian intervention. Georgia has expressed its dissatisfaction with Russian behavior in the Abkhazian situation. Azerbaijan is similarly dissatisfied with Russian support of Armenia. Ukraine could have found itself threatened by large-scale conflict in the Crimea inspired by the RF. The Chechen conflict emerged precisely as a result of non-constructive Russian policy, etc. Thus the thesis arguing for the necessity of the Russian military presence in CIS states does not stand up to criticism and more readily satisfies Moscow's geopolitical ambitions rather than the interests of other CIS states' military security.

Seven years of the CIS's existence have shown that as an integrative union of post-Soviet states, the Commonwealth has not proven succesful. The approximately 800 documents adopted within the structures of the CIS do not function in fact. The coordinating institutions have in no way influenced the economic development of CIS states. Whatever elements of integration have come forth have done so due to bilateral agreements. The amount of Russian trade with other members of the Commonwealth is 2.5 times less than with other countries of the world.

In overall terms it must be stated that the Commonwealth shows a tendency toward the transformation of itself into a mechanism for the realization of exclusively Russian interests. Because of its domination in the working components of the CIS, the RF, in fact, has opportunities to make the decisions that correspond to its national interests and contradict the interests of other member-states. The domination of Russian interests in the CIS has in no way promoted the development of the cooperative potential at first present. This has understandably caused natural anxiety and opposition on the part of the new independent states, which quickly developed their own state structures and intensified their understanding of their own interests.

Economic, political and legal contradictions have been accumulating in relations between CIS states and Russia. Dissatisfaction with the state of affairs became evident during the last meetings of CIS Heads of State, where the non-constructive Russian position was subjected to harsh criticism. The tendency toward the creation of special integrative substructures beyond the framework of the CIS (the Union of the RF and Belarus', the Customs Union of the Four, the Central-Asian Economic Union, GUAM, etc.) is telling. The Commonwealth is gradually transforming itself into a multilevel structure with varying degrees of separate states' participation in integrative processes.

The main reasons for the non-viability and instability of the CIS are:

1. The inequality of relations among CIS states and RF pretensions for political, economic, informational, and socio-cultural domination;

2. RF efforts to view the entire post-Soviet area as its zone of "legitimate" vital interests;

3. The incompatibility of constant RF demands concerning the coordination of the foreign and economic policies of CIS states, along with the practice of totally ignoring its partners' interests and priorities;

4. Constant RF attempts to form a new military-political block or system of collective security (for whom and against whom?) within the framework of the CIS.

5. The RF's strategic course toward the development of supra-state structures, under its control, within the CIS; the progressive integration of post-Soviet states into a new powerful geopolitical block.

The RF's policy concerning the CIS. The main strategic priorities of RF policy relating to the CIS have always been determined by its attempts to use this structure as a tool for the reintegration of the USSR in whatever form, and as a means of advancing and materializing the RF's economic, political, military and territorial ambitions beyond its current borders. Established as a union of independent states, the CIS gradually transformed itself into a political and economic structure fully controlled by Moscow. The RF not only wants to be the leader and new center of the CIS, but openly declares its right for complete domination in this organization. The Russian version of the CIS that was first presented at the 1994 Moscow Summit could not be characterized as anything but a long-term program for the reintegration of the USSR. Moscow became the center for the entirety of CIS activity, breaking all previous agreements. All key committees and ruling bodies of the CIS are headed by representatives of the RF. The totally Russified Committee on Defense was transformed into a puppet that formally asserts RF military operations in CIS states. One more shocking example of the "equalité a là Russie" that reigns in the CIS is constituted by the International Economic Committee, where the RF has reserved for itself 50% of all votes. Persistent RF attempts to consolidate the CIS's status in the UN can potentially be used for the purposes of demanding financial support and the sanctioning of RF military operations under the umbrella of peacemaking activity. They can also lead to the transformation of the CIS into a powerful tool for the advancement of RF interests within the entire geopolitical area of the former USSR and far beyond its borders.

The main directions of RF geopolitical strategy concerning CIS states were provided in President Yeltsin's well-known Decree No 940, dated September 19, 1995, entitled "Russia's Strategic Course Concerning Member-States of the CIS", where the entire post-Soviet space is proclaimed to be "first of all, a zone of Russian interests". The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) elaborated this strategy in its report entitled "Russia and the CIS: does the Position of the West Require Adjustment?" This report asserts that "objective" re-integrational processes will inevitably precondition the restoration of "a new economic defense zone" under RF leadership within the CIS. This report proposed two clearly defined alternatives. The first proposes complete integration in the economic and military spheres along with the formation of a "mutual defense zone", united leadership and military units that would guarantee stabilization, democratization and the advancement of reforms. The second alternative proposes the complete destabilization of the CIS, which would "constitute a threat to the whole of mankind".

It is entirely clear that the RF has no intention of building relations with CIS countries based on equal partnership and the norms of international law, or of respecting their economic and political sovereignty and territorial integrity. "Integration", the necessity and benefit of which are widely declared in the document, in practice signifies the erosion of the sovereignty of CIS member-states, the subordination of their activity to RF interests, and the regeneration of a centralized superpower.

The creation of a unified state on the territory of the former USSR first based on confederate and later on federal principles was also predicted in the report entitled "Will the (Soviet) Union be Re-born in 2005?", prepared in Moscow by experts of the influential Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. The majority of former Soviet republics except for the Baltic states are to enter this creation. Russia certainly has to become the heart and center of this new state. This document underlines that the core factors in Russia's relations with neighbors that have not joined the new Union are, first of all, Russian vital interests, meaning that "it has to be ready to resort to all means including the use of force to defend its interests".

Accordingly, long-term RF strategy should include:

· the reform of geopolitical priorities and mechanisms of the RF's foreign policy with the aim of increasing Russian domination and influence in each CIS state;

· a shift of emphasis in CIS activity away from the signing of treaties toward the development of cooperative projects in political, social and economic spheres. The creation of financial-industrial groups, customs unions, stock exchanges, joint banks and credit unions with the aim of gaining entry into and establishing domination for the RF in these structures. The Russian language and Russian cultural and informational expansion should play a particular role in this;

· the formation of a wide network of formal and informal contacts with economic and cultural élites in the CIS in order to create the necessary conditions for the dissemination and implementation of a given strategy "from the inside".

Analogous recommendations are found in another report of the Council on the Foreign and Defense Policy of the RF entitled "The CIS: the Beginning or the End of History?" (1997), where the following is said: "it is necessary to admit that without severe therapy Russian-Ukrainian relations will not recover. Although the decomposition of Ukraine is a problematic alternative for Russia, it is better to promote its decomposition than to suffer from constant Ukrainian challenges and the erosion of our efforts in the near abroad."

Thus, despite all of the differences among the representatives of the RF's ruling élite, among different parties and political groupings, Russia's general line concerning Ukraine entirely corresponds to two basic directives:

1. The Maximal Program entails the disintegration or complete subordination of Ukraine, the return of Ukraine to its former semi-colonial status in the confines of a new Union, confederation or federation, and the establishment of total control over the foreign, military and economic policies of Ukraine.

2. The Minimal Program entails the "finlandization of Ukraine" in a "legitimate zone of Russian influence", progressive economic, socio-cultural expansion into Ukraine with the purpose of closely adjusting its policies with the RF's national interests, and the ensuring of the political obedience and economic dependence of Ukraine.

Taking into account a number of internal and external factors it can be stated that the support of the integrative processes in the CIS was and remains an extremely important issue for the Russian Federation. At the same time the RF's policy of the "forced integration" of CIS states has failed. Among the main reasons for this are:

· the scarcity of material and financial resources of the RF and the impossibility of a determined expansionist policy in these conditions;

· the chronological coincidence of NATO's eastward expansion and the stratification of the CIS that considerably weaken the RF's superpower potential;

· the broadening and strengthening of relations between CIS states and countries of both the West and the East and their gradual integration into other economic zones (the EU, BSEC, CEFTA ).

In these conditions Moscow must expeditiously search for new models for its relations with its CIS partners, primarily with Ukraine.

Ukraine in the CIS. Two diametrically opposite ideologies concerning the sense and perspectives for development of the CIS came into being at the very beginning of the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Ukraine regarded the CIS to primarily be a mechanism for the "civilized divorce" of the former USSR's component parts and as an organization that Ukraine would remain in only for a short period of time, until its final integration into a united Europe. The RF's position is quite distinct in that it has and continues to view the CIS as an intermediate stage in the restoration of a former empire and sees the CIS in its present form as a sphere for the domination of Russian interests.

From the point of view of Russian geopoliticians, Ukraine's westward orientation and attempts to separate from Russia's sphere of influence will undoubtedly lead to the emergence of a permanent source of internal conflicts. With no evidence at all to prove their assertions, they ascribe Ukrainians, supposedly relying on the West's support, with hopes of "gradually deporting a part of the Russian population from Ukraine and of Ukrainianizing the rest of it, together with Russian speaking Ukrainians". Precisely such thinking more accurately reflects the mindset of Russians themselves (how they would act in our place) rather than how Ukrainians (for whom this is inconceivable) think.
In order to counteract the RF's "telurocratic" ambitions Ukraine has had to block any propositions concerning the creation of supra-state structures within the CIS. The necessity for these structures had been explained in terms of the supposed impossibility in their absence of the coordination of economic relations and of the regulation of thorny political problems among Commonwealth members on their territory. In a similar way, decisions taken by leaders of respective states would have no chances of being fulfilled. Meanwhile, RF aspirations for guaranteeing the domination of its interests in the Commonwealth's collective bodies remained unspoken.

In the conditions of the deepening economic crisis adherents of the concept of state status for the CIS can rely on substantial support. This support comes from the populations of Russia as well as of Ukraine and the other new independent states that nostalgically sustain memories of the relatively stable economic conditions of the former USSR.

Ukraine in the near future is fated to not simply preserve, but also to intensify and develop ties with former component parts of the USSR. This is due to its dependence on eastern energy resource supply, the absence of alternative markets for Ukrainian goods, socio-political, individual ties etc., and the fact that post-Soviet connections still carry profound weight while the alternatives to them are too uncertain.

Ukraine made a stake on the development of generally bilateral rather than multilateral relations within the CIS. Being prepared for signing are international programs for the long-term (10 year) economic cooperation of Ukraine with Belarus', Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Uzbekistan. Support of the idea of state status for the CIS would signify activity based on the principles of "telurocracy". But here as well it has become clear that even in tête-à-tête relations with each of its Commonwealth partners the RF, as a more powerful state, enforces its will. The absence of unity among members of the CIS, on the issue concerning the RF's hegemonic aspirations inclusively, is beneficial only for the latter.

Other post-Soviet states have already partly chosen their own logic of existence, eg. "talasocratic" (the Baltic states) or "telurocratic" (Belarus'), but the majority of them, like Ukraine, are at the search stage. To the point, it is well known that the unification of Germany and the fear on the part of its neighbors of the possibility of German hegemony over them was one of the factors that sped-up the consolidation of the European Union. In the same way a mindful and consistent Ukrainian policy aimed at closer coordinative efforts with Georgia and Moldova, the Transcaucases states, the countries of former Soviet Central Asia, and especially Kazakhstan, would help to strengthen Ukraine's international standing.

The main drawing force of the CIS for Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan lay precisely in the liquidation of a center. These countries categorically reject the idea of the creation of a new center in Moscow. Precisely for this reason Ukraine constantly emphasizes its status of associate member and carefully avoids close participation in political and military cooperation. Moldova has declared that its participation is to be limited only to the economic sphere. Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan in large measure abstain from or refuse to sign CIS agreements instead of participating in real cooperation. Most CIS summits have also ended in failure. Leading Ukrainian ministries have come to the conclusion that the Moscow prepared propositions concerning the customs and monetary unions together with other RF propositions regarding Ukraine's joining of the economic union as a full member are premature. This is especially the case in view of the fact that Ukrainian propositions concerning the defense of the economic sovereignty of CIS states were taken into consideration during the preparation of pertinent documents.

Moreover, Ukraine's participation in the proposed unions can be interpreted as a change of foreign policy and can undermine its image as an independent state in the eyes of members of the European community. Ukraine's acceptance of the above-mentioned treaties can give Russia the reason to pressure Ukraine with the aim of further involving it in other supranational CIS military and political structures.

Thus, full Ukrainian membership in the above-mentioned structures can only lead to its political and economic estrangement from Central and Western European countries.

Ukrainian strategic policy concerning the CIS can hardly be termed consistent and optimal (from the point of view of national interests). Nevertheless, in the years 1991-1998 Ukraine in large part managed to counteract RF attempts to force its economic and political domination, mainly due to its self-proclaimed status of associate membership in the CIS, and the constant pressure of national-patriotic forces inside the country.

The further evolution of the Commonwealth into a structure analogous to the EU will in large part depend on the pace, consistency, and results of economic and socio-political transformations in Russia and Ukraine. Unsolved crucial socio-economic phenomena, especially set against the background of weak integration into the world economy and a growth in serious political risks connected with the upcoming presidential elections in both countries strengthen the probability of undesirable scenarios for the development of the situation. In particular, powerful political forces will come into being that see the solution of the existing problems in the reintegration of the countries of the CIS and in the creation of a self-sufficient geoeconomic and geopolitical entity on the territory of the former USSR. The consequences of such for the new independent states, Ukraine in that number, will be isolation from overall-civilization processes, the prolongation of technological backwardness, the loss of sovereignty, etc.

Ukraine's rational policy concerning the CIS should, first of all, be based on national instead of clan and corporate interests, and second, be directed toward the establishment and support of alternative leadership in this organization and in the region as a whole. As mentioned, the CIS in fact already has a bipolar structure. The formation of the GUAM group (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) under Ukrainian leadership and with the support of other states has been only the first sign of the commencement of new extremely important integrative processes on the territory of the former USSR. These countries understand all of the advantages and benefits that arise from the creation of regional groupings founded on the principles of equal and mutual support. The final result of these processes will be the formation of regional structures and unions "without Moscow" and Ukraine can and should seek for itself the place of "the first among equals" in this new creation.

The meeting in Ashkhabad of the leaders of Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tadjikistan) in January 1998 demonstrated the growing tendency for equal mutually beneficial cooperation among the above-mentioned states as well as the rapid dwindling of Russian strategic positions in this extremely important region. The GUAM states plus the Central Asian states together number nine countries of the CIS that decisively support the idea of the creation of new, equal, and mutually beneficial structures of cooperation. The tendency toward the development of integrative processes in post-Soviet space becomes wholly obvious when added to the above is the growing cooperation between Ukraine and the Baltic states and the creation of the Baltic-Black Sea Alliance (Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania) in May, 1997.

The future of the CIS. The frequent postponement of meetings on the highest level by CIS state leaders testifies to their unresponsiveness regarding the future of the Commonwealth. In fact, except for history, the CIS states have little in common. The axes of the priority interests of separate CIS states are ever increasing in an outward direction from the CIS. Criticism aimed at the RF, which uses the structures of the Commonwealth for pursuing its own goals while disregarding other members' interests is on the increase, as was evidenced by its coming to a head at the Kishinev summit of CIS state leaders.

It is necessary to develop in the nearest future Ukraine's new concept concerning economic cooperation, which will take into account the new realities of post-Soviet geopolitical space and will suit the structure of the state's national interests. Economic cooperation in sub-regional systems that is formed according to states' own spheres of interests, and not according to the principle of existence in post-Soviet space, is worth developing.

The creation of one more system in Eurasian space similar to the European model is hardly possible and rational in view of Ukraine's chosen course toward integration into existent European structures. The strict connection of Ukraine to a new strengthened model of the CIS will mean a renouncing of Ukraine's independent European policy and in time any independence in foreign political and economic affairs. A competitive struggle for geostrategic and geoeconomic influences will undoubtedly appear between the two above-mentioned structures, in which Ukraine will play a peripheral role. It is important for Ukraine to chart courses that will lead to the gradual transformation of the entire Eurasian geopolitical space from the Atlantic to the Pacific into one integrative union of sovereign states free from the domination of a single center. Ukraine is interested in becoming part of both the high technology European market as well as of the expansive Oriental markets, and particularly in finding an opening to the Asian-Pacific region via the RF and Central Asia.

The process of the integration of post-Soviet states according to a western model should occur with the simultaneous development of the mechanisms of integration into the European community. This process, however, has to take place according to a model of convergence rather than to one of parallel or confrontational movement. The history of the formation of the European community shows this road to be relatively prolonged and difficult. This route represents the development of a new system "from the ground up", from the very basement, instead of "from above", with the help of directives and authoritarian measures. We can expect that the time needed for this system to develop is comparable to the time needed for Ukraine to enter into European structures. An instance of Ukraine being forced "from above" will in practical terms mean the complete neglecting of its national interests and will lead to an economic and social catastrophe followed by Ukraine's absorption into the system of interests of Russian capital. . The Euro-Atlantic Axis

a) West-European States and the Problems
of European Integration

The "strategic openness" of both partners is one of the potential promotional factors in the development of relations between Ukraine and leading West-European states and in the integration of Ukraine into European cooperation and security structures. Ukraine as well as the European community (both the institution and national states) formulate strategies for their development and attempt to determine their specific roles and models of survival for the future. This search for identity in a rapidly changing environment allows partners the opportunity to actively participate in determining each other's goals and priorities.

This process is already taking place. Let us recall, for instance, Ukraine's efforts in promoting the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO members or the European Council's actions in persuading Ukraine to abolish the death penalty.

However, strategic openness and geopolitical indetermination can become a barrier on the road to Ukraine's integration into the European community. Moreover, threats to Ukrainian security, including the conflictogenical process of the formation and growth in power of national and local political and economic élites, the neglect of democratic norms in the day-to-day existence of Ukrainian governing organs and society, etc., can only drive attention away from "external" relations with West-European states that do not propose adequate solutions for acute Ukrainian domestic contradictions.

In order to prevent a "turning away from Europe" it is necessary to underline the geopolitical importance of broadening bilateral relations with West-European states and of strengthening integrative processes. It is also necessary to demonstrate the practical benefits that arise from this kind of cooperation, and the opportunities for the adaptation of European experience on Ukrainian ground. One of the possible scenarios for the strengthening of these integrative processes is proposed below.

In order to maximize westward policy it would be worthwhile to more fully utilize the advantages of the poliarchic model that was developed in the bilateral relations of West-European states. The essence of this model is based on the premise that regional integration is closely connected to the processes of decentralization and regionalization. Additionally, interstate relations in the EU, for instance, are determined and formed not only by state bureaucratic institutions or the bodies of the Union itself. Growing in importance are contacts between separate individuals, non-governmental organizations and structures, and direct relations between regions (federal lands, provinces) of various states.

It would therefore be important for Ukraine to begin the process of the diversification of relations with West-European states, giving priority to the non-governmental level of these relations and involving as wide as possible circle of societal sectors.

Also worth keeping in mind is the structural and organizational multi-facetedness of European integration, of which Ukraine aspires to become an active member. On the one hand, this is a process of state blocking inside the EU. The activity of temporary (or regular) coalitions and unilateral initiatives of this or that state are directed toward solving those problems that belong to the spheres in which these coalitions or states are leaders. The "breakthrough" of some leads to the "gingering" of others. Coalitions and alliances within the parameters of the CIS, for instance, are directed first of all toward disintegration, toward the blockage of these or other generally integrative initiatives. On the other hand, the EU as the heart of European integrative processes is not the sole mechanism for the bringing together of member-states. We can mention a whole number of institutions (the Council of Europe, NATO, the WEU etc.) that add their own specifics to the integrational complex.

In the development of foreign-policy strategy it would be important to consider the fact that despite their long-standing tradition of cooperation, West-European states have not solved the problems of delegating state mandates to the center. This dilemma finds its most vivid expression during the trials of the development of mutual foreign and security policies of the EU, and in discussions concerning defense policy and the creation of a European army. This contradiction will apparently never be fully resolved within the framework of the EU.

This is why European integration is acquiring the form of a balancing of national interests and a balancing of relations between state and supranational bureaucracies. This balancing ensures the preservation of national sovereignty and ably used becomes one of the factors that stimulates the majority of integrative processes. Ukraine should more widely utilize the experience of EU member-states in defending its national interests, in searching for mutually acceptable compromises, etc. Relations with the region's states and with European institutions should not develop into a "game with one net", where one side forces the other to accept its prescriptions and scenarios.

The poliarchic model of development became possible in Europe due to the fact that integration was at first born and developed in the economic sphere, gradually evolving to the level of the development of common political approaches. The establishment of one state's political domination is made impossible by the prime importance of the economic sphere, the "dictate" of its market model, and the severe necessity to compete with the USA and with APR states. The bureaucratic system of the European Union has used the same principle and has rendered impossible one state's control of any committee or of any direction of integration.

West-European integrative processes have never been the object of short-term political speculation and maneuvers, always having remained as issues of strategic weight. Supporters and adversaries of integration have stable aware positions, calculated aware strategies and are forced to adapt them according to the conditions of their environment. Something opposite frequently occurs in Ukraine, and instead of being a strategically aware priority, integration becomes a declarative concept that is used as a tool in political battles.

The utilization of the catch-words of European integration only as some kind of trump-card in the domestic political game and for the purpose of receiving the next portion of international aid will push Europeans away from Ukraine and will make our state less attractive for West-European capital.

Despite the declarations about the geopolitical importance of orientation toward European states and structures, Ukraine has not developed a viable strategy for European integration, either on the basis of bilateral relations or on an institutional basis. The concept of strategy here indicates a complex model for the definition of the importance of this or that initiative, its goals and priorities, the ways and means for its realization, and the resources necessary to attain the announced goal.

Ukraine, from this point of view, does not have a general national strategy concerning the solution of the complex tasks of European integration. Dozens of state institutions and official groups and committees are involved in the decision-making process along this direction. Because of the improper coordination of their efforts and the vague definition of their responsibilities and authority a significant part of the decisions made by state bureaucratic machinery are never put into practice.

While meeting time constraints on all integrative initiatives Ukraine disperses its intellectual and material resources and frequently deals with routine secondary problems, leaving truly important initiatives without due attention and adequate resources. In other words, Ukraine's policy concerning West-European states and European institutions is too wide-ranging and non-constructive to be effective.

An intensive approach to integration and bilateral relations should replace the extensive approach (where the number of events, trips and visits, and signed agreements overshadows their practical output, and political symbolism drives attention away from constructiveness and beneficial cooperation). Such "renewed" activity could be started in several priority directions:

1. The development of a national strategy for European integration. Such a strategy should become a document of "principal steps". It would be comprehensively strengthened by a material and intellectual plan of action that clearly defines the authority and responsibilities of various bodies, their reporting etc. Internal Ukrainian adaptation to European realities and the transformation of integration into a powerful generator for domestic change can be regarded as the main goal of strategy according to President Kuchma's Decree no. 615, dated June 11, 1998, entitled "The Strategy of Ukraine's Integration into the EU".
In order to develop an active national strategy with clear priorities and real expected results Ukraine would have to complete a revision of all integrative aspects and would have to select vital directions from among them. State resources, which are always scarce, should be concentrated toward the completion of these primary tasks. Separate mini-strategies should be developed for each goal that would ensure not only the declaration, as is the case today, but also the attainment of each goal.

2. The reaching of a correlation of values, norms and principles of Ukraine's internal political and social life with the norms and principles of the Euro-community. The following should be mentioned in this connection:

· the democratization of the process of state decision-making (through the retraining of officials and the creation of conditions necessary for the effective activity of the mass-media and non-governmental institutions in controlling the processes of making and implementing decisions);

· the attainment of a general national consensus concerning the main directions of Ukraine's European policy;

· the creation of mechanisms of civil control over state institutions;

· the conducting of a comprehensive educational campaign for primary and high-school students (assisted by the preparation of specific manuals) aimed at explaining the advantages of and the necessity for integration into the European community;

· the arrangement of a youth exchange program based on existent European models;

· the development of state policy for Ukrainian students/professionals studying abroad, the purpose of which would be the accumulation of a competitive national intellectual potential;

· the organization of a coordinated long-term "Euro publicity campaign". Its goal, through the skillful use of the principles of mass-media techniques and influence over a mass audience, would be the orientation of society to the benefits and inevitability of integration.

3. The search for a strategic partner among European states. However paradoxical it may seem, the US is Ukraine's main lobbyist in Europe, especially in Euro-Atlantic structures. However, American support will soon only partly satisfy core Ukrainian demands in Europe, especially in the case of the "EURO's" successful introduction. This is on account of the growing political and economic world influence of the EU, the aspiration of Europeans for gaining leadership in the solution of the security problems of the continent, and the development of a conflict of interests between the European Union and the US. The "Europeanization" of Ukraine's continental lobby could commence in the following spheres:

· the intensification of cooperation with West-European states; the establishment of a wide-ranging dialog between experts and scholars which could promote closer ties between Ukrainian and West-European political élites;

· Ukraine's active participation in discussions concerning NATO's new Strategic Concept and NATO's role in Europe, with an accent on the strengthening of the European pillar of the Alliance;

· the intensification of the dialog with the EU and the WEU in the spheres of domestic and security policy, as these institutions will determine the future of continental security policy;

· the intensification of regional cooperation (particularly with neighboring countries' border regions) and leadership in the effective resolution of regional conflicts;

· the realization of the strategic "European transport aircraft" project. This undertaking should be given proper state support and should symbolize Ukraine's ability to complete difficult high technology projects. Moreover, the success of the project would mean the freeing of European dependency on American strategic transport aviation. The new aircraft will seem especially attractive to member-states of the Euro-corps, which already have experience in using Ukrainian "Antonovs" in strategic maneuvers.

4. The creation of conditions necessary for the attraction of European investments. This direction will certainly demand the most serious efforts since it deals with fundamental changes in Ukrainian economic life. In the meanwhile, it would be prudent to consider the interstate patronage of investments, and measures that would prevent the over-indulgence of officials in servicing foreign investments in Ukraine.

On the other hand, Ukraine could take part in strategic European projects such as the "Trans-European Network" (the development of continental communication systems). The Federal Republic of Germany, which has vital economic interests in Central and Eastern Europe, could become Ukraine's prime strategic investment partner. The level and intensity of Ukrainian cooperation with West-European states are integrative indicators of the presence or absence of the government's political will to continue the policy of European integration, to conduct economic and political reforms, and to instill democratic norms and principles into Ukrainian life.

It is also important to transform cooperation with West-European states into an active tool capable of ensuring one of the most important national state interests - survival in a competitive international environment, and the ensuring of the prosperity and security of the populace.

B) The USA and Canada

The main Western geopolitical priority after the disintegration of the USSR and the de-facto formation of a mono-polar world structure is the consolidation of victory and the consolidation and global spreading of western values, democratic principles and institutions, and the liberal-democratic ideology. It is characteristic that among the main geopolitical priorities of Euro-Atlantism, and first of all of the USA, are strict and pragmatic orientations concerning the limitation of adversaries' influence and the strengthening of strategic potential on regional and global levels. The above go together with measures intended to stabilize and spread traditional liberal-democratic values and institutions. Also of prime significance is the strategic political and economic strengthening of the Rimland. These are the reasons for NATO's present eastward expansion, plans for integrating CE and the Baltic states into the EU, the profound geopolitical importance of Ukraine's position, and western anxiety concerning the political and economic orientations of the Transcaucases and Central Asia.

The prevention of Russia's transformation into a Eurasian regional hegemony hostile to the USA was declared as one of the USA's vital interests of the 21st century. This idea was presented in a well-known 1995 report, entitled "National Interests of the USA", prepared by Harvard University, the RAND Corporation and a number of other US analytical centers. Ukraine and the Baltic states are also included in the USA's zone of vital interests. The fundamental importance of preventing Russian aggression, pressure or blackmail toward these states is underlined in the paper as well.

Another core document entitled "National Security Strategy in the Next Century", signed by President Clinton in May, 1997 stresses that the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 12 new independent states, the Baltic states included, are of vital importance for US interests.

US Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbot emphasized in June, 1997 that the Transcaucases and Central Asia are today also strategically important regions for the USA. Turkey plays a key role in this region as a leader in spreading Euro-Atlantic influence in counterbalance to the influence of Islamic fundamentalism (Iran) and Eurasian ideology in general, along the "Moscow-Teheran" strategic axis. Thus a strong basis exists to speak about the formation of a Baltic - Black Sea - the Caspian zone of US and Euro-Atlantic interests.
Ukraine holds a key position in the South-Western flank of the Rimland and in fact controls the main transportation corridors between two spheres of civilization both in latitudinal as well as in longitudinal directions. This strategically important Ukrainian position can be effectively utilized (although this is not yet the case) for the implementation of Ukraine's basic national interests and its accelerated integration into European economic and political space and security structures.

It can be stated without exaggeration that Ukraine's entry, or more correctly its return, to western civilization will significantly influence the entire geopolitical structure of the world. Leading western analysts unanimously affirm this fact. The priority of Ukraine's orientation toward integration into EU, WEU and NATO political structures, etc. has to be accompanied by a wide-ranging program of measures directed toward comprehensive integration into European socio-cultural space, and an openness not only to economic investments but also to cultural and informational ones.

The policy concerning principal strategic partners (in the West as well as in the East) should be thoroughly reviewed. In a geopolitical sense US dependence on Ukraine is not much smaller, if not greater, than Ukrainian dependence on the US. The US, by the way, understands this. It would be good for Ukraine to understand this as well, and to also let the US understand, that it understands. Otherwise the repeat of the greatest Ukrainian error concerning strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is inevitable. The surrender of nuclear weapons was not a mistake. This was the only possible and correct decision. The mistake lay in giving up the weapons for practically nothing in exchange. American analysts maintain that Ukraine could have received much more, we stress much more, for the world's third most potent nuclear arsenal. This includes both economic aid as well as assistance with transformational changes.

Ukraine's relations with the USA. The future of Ukraine will no doubt depend on its relations with the United States. Present relations have to be regarded as beginnings, even despite bilateral declarations that the partnership between the two states is strategic. The reason for this is, first of all, because of the undetermined character of these relations and in the unpredictability of each state for the other. The USA's undeterminate position concerning Ukraine is visible, first of all, in a noticeably inconsistent American-Ukrainian tactical course. Thus, George Bush's position after Ukraine's declaration of independence was too careful and, in fact, was reduced to being a policy, coordinated with Russia, for Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. Bill Clinton's administration, starting with support for Ukraine and the establishment of a strategic partnership has gradually and noticeably changed its course and has resorted to using Ukraine as a chip in the USA's game with Russia. It was the USA that at first supported the idea of a Ukraine-NATO Charter and then did much to prevent this document from being signed in a form that Ukraine was interested in. It was the USA that "hooked" Ukraine on the "drug" of aid and then played a leading role in considerably cutting foreign financial aid to Ukraine. Desperately needed in the time of the growing Russian monetary crisis foreign credits were forthcoming only after a considerable time-lag. Furthermore, Ukraine was presented with a whole new series of conditions, which were considerably more rigid than those demanded of Russia.

The USA's double standard of policy toward Russia and Ukraine clearly emerged during the preparation and signing of the agreement concerning the reduction of conventional arms weaponry in Europe, in the issue concerning Ukraine-Iran cooperation, etc. The sudden change in American attitude toward Ukraine after the Bill Clinton - Boris Yeltsin summit in Helsinki in the spring of 1996 is also worth mentioning.

It seems that the inconsistency of a tactical Ukrainian-American course is the direct result of an absence of a decided American strategic position concerning Ukraine.

Ukraine's strategic line toward the USA is also vague. During his speech to students of the Diplomatic Academy, H. Udovenko, as then Head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, defined the following, by now traditional, priority strategic directions of Ukraine's foreign policy: reintegration into European structures; the intensification of transatlantic cooperation with the world's developed states ("the G7", West-European states) and with the RF and other CIS states; cooperation with Central-Eastern European countries; with Latin American, Middle-Eastern and Central Asian, African and Asian-Pacific countries; activity in international organizations...". Thus, almost all world states and regions were seen in priority terms. Unfortunately, it is impossible to concentrate foreign political efforts in all directions at once, as Ukraine like any other state has limited means, especially considering all of its current hardships. The strategic line toward the USA has somehow become lost in the above-mentioned thesis about foreign political priorities, and has been timidly hidden in the phrase concerning transatlantic cooperation. Both indecision in intentions and unsureness in means can be hidden behind this phrase together with the desire to develop cooperation. This indetermination and unsureness together with, unfortunately, a lack of professionalism, are clearly seen in well-known to all Ukrainian tactical mistakes concerning the USA. The creation of a clear notion of Ukraine-US relations demands an awareness of the sense of "strategic partnership".

At present, in addition to the US, Israel, Germany, and Poland have been declared as Ukraine's strategic partners. It is interesting to note that strategic partner Poland, that produces a GNP almost two hundred times smaller than our strategic partner the US, in 1996, for instance, had an exchange of goods level with Ukraine greater than that of the US. Its investment total was all of two times smaller. Relations on a strategic level are probably the relations, whose course and results determine whether the corresponding strategic goals of partners will be achieved. If this is true then it is possible to speak about an asymmetry in the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the US. In order to explain the reasons for this we will examine the national interests of Ukraine and of the US.

In the overwhelming majority of directions in the European region these interests coincide with each other, or in the least, do not contradict each other (in opposition to the situation concerning Russia's national interests vis-à-vis both Ukraine and the US). The above is applicable to questions connected with the possibility of the formation of a new geopolitical power in the region, in opposition to the Euro-Atlantic community; with questions connected to NATO expansion; the general structure of European security; potential corridors for the transportation of Caspian oil; and Ukraine's potential geopolitical orientations. Namely, these corresponding interests can serve as a basis for Ukrainian-American strategic partnership.

However, a fundamental difference in approach also exists. Ukraine views the US as its principal partner in its attempts at integration into European economic, political, and security structures. Ukraine for the US is only a tool, or to be more exact, one of many tools in its grand geopolitical game with Russia.

A popular thesis among Ukrainian, and not only Ukrainian, analysts, is one that holds that an improvement in Ukrainian-US relations occurs only in the case of worsening Russian-US relations, and that the reverse situation also holds true.

Undoubtedly, however, today the main destiny of Ukraine as a tool of US policy is, first of all, its role in manipulations with Russia. Thus H.Kissinger and Z.Brzezinski regard Ukraine's role to be of great importance for the USA, but still consider the results of the emergence and existence of independent Ukraine through the prism of Russia. Z.Brzezinski writes that independent Ukraine's emergence is one of the three most important geopolitical events of the 20th century, as it indicated the end of imperialist Russia¹. H.Kissinger² acknowledges that the role of Ukraine is "of crucial importance" for the US, because "after the establishment of reforms Russia continues to produce reasons that arouse doubt as to the real ability of this state and its leaders to abandon former expansionist traditions". ¹ Z.Brzezinski, Suchasnist', 1992, No 9.
² H.Kissinger, Diplomatiya. - Moscow, Ladomir, 1997.
After winning the Cold War and having broken the imperialistic essence of the Russian Federation the "idea" of American manipulations of Russia consists of preventing Russia from losing its influence in Europe and Asia. After all, Europe with the EU, and Asia with China are two important geopolitical theaters where the US is struggling to maintain its present and future world dominance.

The US, thus, is the only superpower in the world that is truly able to conduct, and exert, direct and indirect multilateral (with the help of international organizations, Europe, Japan, and even Russia, etc.) influence over Ukraine. It is logical to affirm that strategic partnership with this - only such state in the world - has to become priority number one of Ukrainian foreign policy. And thanks to the USA's unique means and role the pre-eminence of our transatlantic priority will not only not contradict our general line toward strong regional policy, but will indeed even promote it.

In terms of geopolitics Ukraine has to place itself as a player on the US side in Europe. This, however, in no way excludes the necessity for the comprehensive maintenance and development of equal mutually beneficial relations with Russia. Ukraine has to build its relations with Russia in order not to give Russia a reason to renew its imperialistic ambitions. German political scientist K. Grobe writes: "...a westward oriented Ukraine could become... a source of spreading stability into other "difficult" regions of the former USSR. This would be beneficial for Russia".

Ukraine represents a vitally important factor in the formation of a new geopolitical power on the territory of the former USSR. Russia understands this and actively strives to pull Ukraine over to its side. More importantly, Russia constantly outplays the US, which is always late on the scene. While the US discussed issues concerning the freezing of aid to Ukraine and promoted a blockade of new international credits, Russia actively and systematically increased its presence in Ukraine and aspired to establish direct or indirect control over all strategically important enterprises and spheres of production. This is the case even when today such a tactic proves to be economically unprofitable. This concerns oil-gas pipelines as well as strategically important industrial plants, together with key objects of the military-industrial complex. Russian pressure to involve Ukraine in military-technical cooperation with states of the Tashkent Treaty is on the increase. Russian attempts to establish control over the Ukrainian mass-media are especially alarming. At a certain stage these processes can become irreversible. President Kwasniewski of Poland (in Zeshuv, in May, 1998) was entirely correct in stating that the window of opportunity for helping Ukraine is closing.
At present the issue concerning the stabilization of the territorial integrity of Russia appears as one of its thorniest problems. The state's predicament is complicated by governmental and social instability, set against the background of an economic crisis. Russian state bodies are weak and unsure of themselves. The armed forces, according to Defense Minister I. Sergeev, are battle-ready only "in places". The Institute for Defense Studies ("INOBIS") of the Russian Federation openly recommends to the State Defense Council making nuclear tactical weapons the cornerstone of Russia's defense. However, the use of nuclear weapons against neighbors (at issue are tactical weapons) is suicidal for a state where the government shows discord well before the start of any war.

Thus, Russia's territorial integrity cannot be guaranteed by its (insufficient) present potential, but by a security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok, with Russian participation in it. Despite the abyss that separates Russia and NATO, the realities of life push both sides toward rapprochement. Z. Brzezinski has written about the growing economic potential of China as a reason, first of all for Russia, to seek such rapprochement.

The "American" dimension of Ukraine's policy has to exist in connection with policy concerning NATO. NATO has not yet developed into a pan-European security system. However, it has already lost its adversaries - the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. The Partnership for Peace Program as well as eastward expansion of the Atlantic organization were undoubtedly initiated and carried through by the US, as the alternative to NATO expansion was its folding. The US supported the growth of NATO, first of all, in order to remain in Europe in a political sense in conditions when the strengthening of an integrative Europe has created a repelling effect for the US. Thus, NATO today appears as an "anchor" for the political (including military) presence of the US in Europe. If so, closer Ukrainian ties with NATO mean closer ties with the US. This is the reason why the recommendations of professionals who continue to insist that Ukraine should conduct a more decided policy concerning NATO are accurate.

Strategic partnership between Ukraine and the USA under any conditions, if it is strategic, should be filled with real content, not with declarations. Ukraine is internally ready for reforms on all levels. Only a push is needed. It is difficult to disagree with the western position that reforms rather than discussions about reforms are needed. However, funds are necessary to conduct reforms. The West has these funds and they can be provided in the form of credits. Otherwise the realization of the so-called "Belarus' option" is entirely possible.

There is no doubt that the loss of Belarus' represents one of the biggest western strategic mistakes since the end of the Cold War. Belarus' had a democratic government and sought western support and aid, which is did not obtain. As a result Belarus' became practically lost to the West.

Taking into account Ukraine's possible role in Russia's transformation into a new empire, the consequences in the Ukrainian case could be much more serious.